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IV. During the rebellion the ordinary laws of war as to enemy's
country werc, by the general policy of the Government, sanctioned
by Congress and the President's proclamation of August 16th
1861, so far modified that in such parts of the rebel states as
were permanently occupied and controlled by the Union military
forces, and where rebellion had ceased and was no longer probable,
the Government assumed to interfere no further with the rights of
person and property of the enemy than 'should be required by
necessary subjection to military government.
But this immunity only extends to those who were loyal, or who
ceased to engage in, aid or encourage rebellion. And in such case
property would be liable to be occupied, taken, damaged or destroyed, as in loyal states.52
WM. LAWRENCE.

(To be continued.)

RECENT AMERICAN
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Court of Appeals of Maryland.
SAMUEL D. LEWIS v. BALTIMORE & 01110 RAILROAD
COMPANY.'
Where the plaintiff has been guilty of a plain act of carelessness which has
contributed to an accident, it is the duty of a court as matter of law, to say that
he cannot recover.
Plaintiff desiring to cross a street in Baltimore, after dark, the street lamps
being lighted, found a train of railroad cars blocking the crossing. A crowd had
collected waiting for an opportunity to cross, and while plaintiff was waiting two
women had been prevented by the police from creeping under the couplings, but
several persons had climbed up the platforms and thus crossed. After waiting
about five minutes plaintiff started to get on the platform with the intention of
No flag of truce could protect such bonds-which have invariably hereto'fore
been held as illegal and disloyal publications, intended to give aid and comfort to
the enemy-from confiscation and destruction. On the contrary, a party availing
himself of a flag of truce to bring such securities within our lines would be guilty
of a violation of the truce, and become amenable to trial and punishment."
52 The Venice, 2 Wallace 259; Planters' Banbv. Union Bank, 16Wallace 483.
See letter of February 26th 1874, of Quartermaster-General M. C. Meigs, in
appendix to Lawrence's report on War Claims, 1st sess. 43d Cong. ; Senate
Claims Committee's Report, No. 85, 2d sess. 42d Cong., March 27th 1872 ; Mrs.
Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wallace 419 ; Prize Cases, 2 Black 674 ; Senator Carpenter
in Senate, March 19th 1874.
1 We are indebted for this case to F. C. Latrobe, Esq.-ED. Ass. L. Ru.

LEWIS v. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD CO.

285

crossing in the same manner, when the train started and his leg was crushed between two cars. Held, that such an act was contributory negligence and he could
not recover.
The fact that the railroad company was negligent in thus llocking a street
crossing contrary to the city ordinances, did not relieve plaintiff from the duty to
use ordinary care to avoid danger.

Turs was an action to recover damages for injuries alleged to
have been caused by the negligence of the defendant.
The facts were as follows: Between six and seven o'clock of the
evening of January 14th 1871, the appellee, by its agents, was
-engaged in making up a train of freight cars on the line of Howard
street, north and south of Camden street, preparatory to its leaving
the city. The engine was attached to the south end of the train,
some distance below Camden street, and was backing or passing
the cars up Howard to couple with cars north of Camden. The
plaintiff being at the d6pot of the defendant, whither he had gone
to take the train for Washington, started to go to the Fountain
hotel, on the north side of Camden street, a short distance from
the corner of Howard. Arriving at the corner of Howard and
Camden, he found the crossing blocked by the freight cars of the
defendant. . He did not see the engine attached to the train,*
although the street-lamps were lighted, but he admits he did not
look particularly for it, nor did he see any employees of the defendant at or about the crossing. The street bad been blocked by
the cars from twenty-five to thirty minutes, and a number of persons
had collected at the crossing waiting for the train to move. The
plaintiff waited from five to seven minutes, during which time he
saw several persons climb up to the platform of one of the cars,
and thus pass to the opposite side of the street; he also saw the
police stop two women who were attempting to crawl under the
coupling of the cars. Finally, he determined to climb over the
platforms of the two cars, and taking hold of the handle used for
getting on the cars, while in the act of pulling himself up, with
one foot on the platform, and the other hanging down, the train
suddenly moved, and his leg was caught and crushed between the
two cars. The plaintiff also read at the trial certain ordinances
of the city for the purpose of showing that the defendant was
inking up the train and blocking up the crossing in a manner
prohibited by the same.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RobinsoN, J.-The court, in granting the defendant's and in
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refusing the plaintiff's prayers, instructed the jury substantially,
that the plaintiff had by his own negligence contributed to the injury,
and was not, therefore, entitled to recover. We fully agree with
the counsel for appellant, that in cases of this kind, the question
of negligence, as a general rule, is a matter for the determination
of zhe jury, under instructions from the court defining the degree
of care required of each party, according to the nature of the relations borne by the defendant to the party injured.
But we have said more than once, "1that cases may and do sometimes occur, where the court is required to declare some plain act
of carelessnes8 on the part of the plaintiff, to be in law such contributory negligence a,3 will prevent a recovery, or, on the other
hand, where the proof of negligence on the part of tie defendant
is so slight and inconclusive in its natureas to demand from the court
an instruction as to its legal insufficiency to prove negligence, in
order to prevent the jury from indulging in wild speculation or
irrationalconjecture."
In this, as in all other cases, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff, and although it is the province of the jury to decide matters of fact, when evidence legally sufficient for that purpose is
submitted to their consideration, yet this legal sufficiency is a question of law, of which the court is the exclusive judge, and where
the testimony is so slight and inconclusive that no rational mind
can infer from it the fact which it is offered to establish, it is not
only the right, but the duty of the court, when applied to for that
purpose, to instruct the jury that there is no evidence before them
to warrant their finding the fact sought to be established.
Without reviewing the many cases in which the subject of negligence has been considered, the question in this and in all eases of
the like kind, is whether the injury complained of was caused
entirely by the negligence or improper conduct of the defendant, or
whether the plaintiff so far contributed to the same by his own
negligence or want of ordinarycare and prudence, that but for
such negligence or want of care and prudence the injury would not
have happened. In thie first case the plaintiff would be entitled to
recover, in the latter he would not, unless the defendant, by the
exercise of care andprudence, might have avoided the consequences
of the plaintff's negligence. The rule thus laid down in Tuff v.
MVarman, 94 E. C. L. Rep. 583, avoids the distinction between
remote and proximate causes, a subject which PIGOTT, 0. B., says
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has perplexed metaphysicians from the days of the disquisitions
of the schoolmen down to the essays of Hume and Browne, and
presents the law in clear and intelligent terms, suited to the capacities of men of good common sense and ordinary information.
The question in this appeal resolves itself then into this: was
the attempt on the part of the plaintiff to get on the platform of
the cars, under the circumstances,such a glaringact of carelessness
as to amount in law to contributorynegligence P To this, we think,
there can be but one answer. On reaching the crossing at Camden
and Howard, instead of waiting until the train bad moved, or
walking up to Pratt street, the distance of a square only, where
he could have crossed without risk, he attempted, although it was
dark, to get on the platform of one of the cars, at a time, too,
when the defendant was making up its freight-train, and without
even looking or inquiring whether an engine was attached thereto.
For such negligence it is no excuse to say that he had seen five or
six of the crowd of persons there collected make a like attempt
without injury, and especially in the face of the admonition given by
the police, who, in the very presence of the plaintiff, had prevented
two women from exposing themselves to a danger so imminent.
The ordinary care which the law required, is the exercise of such
caution and prudence as are proportioned to the danger to be
avoided, judged by the standard of common prudence and experience. Tested by this standard, the conduct of the plaintiff in
thus exposing himself to a danger so threatening, can be viewed
in no other light than as an act of carelessness, amounting in law
to contributory negliqence.
But it was also contended that the plaintiff is not prevented from
recovering, if the defendant, by the exercise of ordinary care,
might have avoided the consequences of the plaintiff's negligence.
An action, it is true, will lie in some eases where there has been
negligence on both sides, but in such it must appear that the
defendant, by a proper degree of caution, might have avoided the
consequences of the plaintiff's negligence, or, that the latter could
not, by ordinary care and prudence, have avoided the consequences
of the defendant's negligence. 4 This, moreover, implies time for
the party to become aware of the conduct and situation of the
other, for neither could be required to anticipate the other's negligence :" Northern Central Rlailway Co. v. State, use of Gies, 31
Md. 366. A man asleep on the highway, or walking, negligently
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it may be, upon a railroad-track, is not to be run over, provided
It can be avoided by the exercise of ordinary care. Or take the
case of a vessel failing to exhibit the proper lights and to take the
right side of the channel, as required by the Navigation Act; such
acts of negligence are no defence in a suit against a colliding
vessel, provided the latter being aware of the negligence of the
former, could have avoided the collision by the exercise of ordinary
care. Where, however, there is no opportunity for one party to
become aware of the negligence of the other, and the injury is
occasioned by the concurrent and co-operating negligence of both,
it is well settled that no action will lie. In the case before us, if
it be conceded there was negligence on the part of the defendant
in the use of the engine, at the time of the injury, it is equally
clear there was concurrent negligence on the part of the plaintiff
in attempting to get on the platform of the car, and although the
crossing was temporarily blocked, it cannot be imputed as negligence to the agents of the defendant, that they did not anticipate
such recklessness on the part of the plaintiff. After the attempt
was made to get on the cars, it was impossible for the defendant to
have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care, because
there was no interval of time during which the agents of the latter
could become aware of the danger to which the plaintiff was exposed.
Then, on the other hand, so far as regards the prior acts of
negligence of the defendant, such as using an engine on the track
in the city, and blocking the crossings in a manner prohibited by
the city ordinances, it is very clear that such acts of negligence
did not exempt the plaintiff from the use of ordinary care in order
to avoid the consequence of the defendant's negligence. The fact
that a train of cars is unlawfully blocking a crossing is no reason
why a person should throw himself under the wheels, or recklessly expose himself to danger. He is bound, notwithstanding
such acts of negligence, to exercise proper care and prudence, and
if he fails to do so, he cannot hold another responsible for an injury
which may be fairly traced to his own negligence.
In any aspect, therefore, in which this case may be considered,
we are of opinion, there was contributory negligence on*fiLe part
of the plaintiff, and that the judgment below ought to be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
RaucL v. Ltoyd, 31 Pa. St. 358, bears There the plaintiff, a lad of six or seven
a close resemblance to the principal case. years, was on his way home, when he
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found his way blocked at a public cross- the province of the jury to deterntine
ing by a long train of cars, without any the truth of' the matter * * * in
person in charge. He attempted to creep accordance with the instructions of his
under the cars, the cars were moved, and Honor on the questions of law arising
The act
he was injured. The jury found for the upon the ascertained facts."
defendants, apparently on the ground of of the plaintiff in jumping from a train
contributory negligence. The Supreme in motion was held, under the circumCourt, however, reversed the judgment, stances of the case, not to be negligence
holding that the cars were unlawfully in law.
In Anderson v. Steamboat Co., 64 N.
upon the public crossing, and that, considering the age of the child, and the C. 399, IEADE, J., said, "TIhe facts
other circumstances of the case, no neg- being ascertained, negligence is a quesligence could be imputed to him. WOOD- tion for the court. When tihe testimony
WARD,J., said, obiter, in delivering the is all on one side, or is not contradicopinion of the court, "I quite agree tory, the court can decide whether there
with the learned judge that if the plain- is or is not negligence."
In Biles v.
tiff had been an adult of ordinary prm- Holmes, 10 Ired. 16, it was said, "What
dence and discretion, he would have amounts to ordinary care is for the
no right of action ; for, however blame- court. The judge below erred in leavworthy the defendants may have been in ing it to the jury. Whether the proofs
leaving their cars on the crossing, com- establish' certain facts is for the jury;
mon prudence would have restrained but what is the legal effect of these farts,
him from attempting to pass under them, supposing them to exist, is for the
and an adult would be bound to use court." See also Ellis v. P. 6- R. R.
common prudence."
Co., 2 Ired. 140; Heatheock v. PenningIn the principal case, the court held ton, Id. 640.
the act of the plaintiff to be "an act of
MINESOTA.-St. Paul v. KRirby, 8
carelessness amounting in iaw to contri- Minn. 154, was an action for injuries
butory negligence." The question of neg- arising from a defective sidewalk. The
ligence having generally been considered court said the weight of authority is
a question of fact to be determined by clearly that the question of negligence
the jury under the circumstances of each in cases of this kind is mainly one of
case, it may be worth while to examine fact forthe jury, and none of the cases go.
briefly time decisions in the different state further than that it is a mixed question
and the Federal and English courts, to of law and fact,which should be submitted
learn how-far there has been a departure to the jury. In .Jolmson v.
nona J"St.
from this rule.
P. R. Co., 11 Minn. 96, it was said :NORTHnOARoLINA.-In Herring v. "Whether under the circumstances in
101. J- Ra!. R. Co., 10 Ired. 402, it is thich the plaintiff was situated it was
said, "What amounts to negligence is negligence, is a mixed question of law
a matter of law." So also Avera v. and fact. Negligence and prudence are
Saexton, 13 Ired. 253; but this statement relative terms, qualified by the country,
cannot be taken in its broadest sense, the age, the relations and circumstances
for, in Lamnbeth v. .V. 0. R. Co., 66 N. - in which an act is done or omitted. The
C. 494, it was held that the question of law can give no certain fixed standard
contributory negligence was one of fact by which a jury shall be governed in infor the jury, acting under the instruc- quiries of this character, for the simple
tions of the court. "The testimony was reason that there is none.
* These
conflicting in material points, and it was questions are eminently practical, and
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ace, says Story, ' more questions of fact
than law.' " So also Griggs v. NFeckenstein, 14 Minn. 81.
Ono.--Jenkins v. Little Miami R.
Co., 2 Disney 51.
Missount.-Smith v. lann. J- St. Jo.
R. Co, 37 Mo. 292; O'Flaherty v. Union
R,. Co. 40 Mo. 70 ; Morriseyv. Wiggins
Ferry Co., 43 MO. 380; 47 Mo. 523. It
has been there held (Boland v. Missouri
R. Co., 36 Mo. 491) that where the evidence is all one way, the court may determine the whole case as a question of
law ; and that the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence are
for the jury; but whether there is any
evidence, or what its legal effect may
be, is to he decided by the court. As
to railroad crossings at grade, see Tabor
v. Mo. Valley R. Co., 46 Id. 353.
MAINE.-In Storer v. Gowen, 6 Shep.
174, it was held that the judge below
erred in deciding as a matter of law that
it was negligence for a bailea to deliver
a valuable package to a servant eleven
years old. In Stuart v. Inh. of Macias
Port, 48 Maine 477, an action for a defect in a highway, it was held not to be
proper to insttuct tile jury that if they
found that the plaintiff was intoxicated
at the time of injury, he could not recover. So also Stratton v. Staples,
59 Id. 94. Whether or not the loud and
sudden blowing of a steam-whistle as a
signal for starting a train, whereby
plaintiff's horse was frightened, was ordinary care, was left to the jury in Hill
v. Portland 6- loch. R. Co., 55 Maine
438.
LouIIxSAN..-Questions of negligence
are ordinarily for the jury, hut where,
in an action, for injuries receired while
getting upon a train in motion, the jury
found a verdict for plaintiff, the court
reversed the judgment and entered judgment for the defendant, not allowing the
case to go to another jury: Kaiflht v.
Ponclhartrain It. Co., 23 Lou. An. 462;
Lesseps v. Same, 17 Lou. R. 361 ; Fley-

tas v. Same, 18 Id. 339 ; Carlisle v.
Holton, 3 Lou. An. 48.
SOUTH CAROLImA.-Where the slave
of the plaintiff lay down on a railroad
track amid grass so high as to obstruct
a view of him for more than twenty
feet, and in this situation was killed, a
verdict for the plaintiff was set aside, a
new trial refused, and a nonsuit ordered :
Felder v. L. C. 6- C. R. Co., 2 MeMullan 403. In Zenip v. Railway Co., 9
Rich. 94, after a full discussion of authorities, it was held that "what amounts
to negligence is a question of law after
the facts are ascertained ; but that a; the
jury are to ascertain the facts it becomes
a mixed question of law and fact. The
judge must tell the jury what is negligence; it is for them to say, in most
cases, whether the facts sustain the definition." See also Danner v. S. C. R.
0.,

4 Rich. 329.
CALIFORNIA.-In Innis v. Tle Sena-

tor, 1 Cal. 459, it was held that for a
vessel at anchor in a channel during the
night not to exhibit a light is negligence
per se.
Gerke v. Cal. Nav. Co., 9 Cal. 251,
was an action for injury done to plaintiff's crops through the use of improperly-constructed chimneys on the defendant's boat. Said the court, "1What
facts and circumstances constitute evidence of carelessness is a question of
law for the courts to determine. But
what particular weight the jury will give
.to these facts and circumstances is a
matter for the jury." In Wolf v. Water
Co., 10 Cal. 545, the court left the case
to the jury on the question as to whether
the defendant acted as ordinarily prudent
men do in their own concerns. It was
held in Richmond v. Sacr. Val. R. Co.,
18 Cal. 358, that "whether duo diligence or negligence has been shown is a
question for the jury, depending upon
the particular circumstances."
Where
the plaintiff, a lad of sixteen years, got
upon a train in motion to steal a ride
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by the conand was sharplly ordered off"
ductor, and, in jumping from the train
while moving, was injured, the court
said, '" lad the plaintiff been a man,
of mature age and discretion, it might
be said, judicially, by the court,
*
that he had no one to blame but himself;
but being a boy only sixteen years of
age, we think it should have been left to
the jury to say whether in this case the
sharp command of the conductor, accompanied by a show of force, did not,
under all the circumstances, amount to
conipul~on."
In Karr v. Parks, 40
Cal. 188, it was held not to be negli.
genre in law to allow a child of five
years of age to go unattended in an unused street near its father's house; and
in Seigel v. Eisen, 41 Cal. 109, the court
refused to consider it negligence in law to
ride upon the rear platform of a street car.
KANSAs.-Negligence is a question
of fact for the jury, both as to its exitenee and its nature and degree. But
it is for the court to determine the measure of duty resting upon the parties,
and, when the facts are found or agreed
upon, to pronounce upon the question
of negligence as a matter of law. Union
Pac. R. Co. v. Rollins, 5 Ran. 180;
Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Butts, 7 Id. 315;
both well considered cases.
Iow.-Greenleafv. 111. Cent. R. Co,
29 Iowa 15, was an action for injury to
a brakesinan bydefendants' alleged negligence. Wani.1r, J., in delivering the
opinion of the court, assumed that
" whether n party has or has not been
guilty of negligence in a particular case,
is a question of mingled law and fact,
but when the facts are undisputed or conclusively proved, the question of negligence must as a rule be decided by the
court."
This case was followed in
Greenleaf v. Dubuque 6- Sioux City R.
Ga., 33 Id. 52. In Kee.e v. Chicago 4.
-NY IV. R. Co., 30 Id. 813 it was held
not negligence per se to allow dry grass
and weeds to remain on a railroad track,

whereby fire was communicated to plaintitf's hmystack. See also laley v. Samie,
21 Id. 26, and Donaldson v. Miss. 6- .1o.
Pi. Co., 18 Id. 289.
INDIDANA.-M.Where the plaintiff's cow,
running at large, was killed by the defendants' locomotive (lad. 4. Cinn. R.
Co. v. Caddwell, 9 Ind.397), it was held
that the case presented a question of fact
for the jury under legal instructions ;
the facts having been found, the court
drew the inference of inexcusable negligence. So to allow stock to pasture in
a field, the fence of which included a
section of defendants' railroad track,
was held to be negligence in law: lad.
Pitts. 6- Clev. R. Co Y. 3rowen burg, 32
Id.199. When tile
facts are undisputed,
negligence is a question of law : ('agg
v. Vetter, 41 Id. 228. As to railroad
crossings at grade, see Bellrfontaine .R.
Co. v. Hunter, 33 Id. 355.
NEw JEnsEY.-N. J.R. Co. v. West,
4 Vr. 430, was a case where the plaintiff
was injured by the negligent running of
defendants' car past a street crossing
Held, on appeal for refusal to nonsuit,
that when the facts are clear and undisputed and show a want of ordinary care
on the part of the plaintiff, the question
should be decided by the court ; but if
the evidence is doubtful it is for the jury
to decide. So in Central R. Co. v.
Moore, 4 Zabr. 268, 824.
M ssisssrp.-In Dix v. Brown: 4
Miss. 131,-the case was left to the jury
to find the facts under the evidence.
kENTUc Ky.- Green v. Ilollingsworth,
5 Dana 173, was detinue for a watch
loaned and lost. Held to be the province of the court, to decide what was
gross, ordinary and slight neglect under
the circumstances, and of the jury to
find whether the facts established negligence. In Mlatheny v. ll'o/ffs,
2 Day.
137, The plaintiff was injured by falling
into an excavation carelessly left open
by defendant. 1hehl, that the degree of
prudence required of plaintiff was hard
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to define, and should be left to the jury. better opinion and the existing rule in
See also Louisv. 6- Nash. R. Co. v. Col- this state. Such being the general rules,
there have been said to be two classes
lins, Id. 114.
PENNSYLVANIA.-The numerous de- of exceptions, in which negligence becisions in this state seem to have settled comes a question of law : 1st. Where
most points that can arise. "The law the standard or measure of duty is deis well settled that what is, and what is filled by law, and is the same under all
not, negligence in a particular case, is circumstances ; 2d. Where there is such
generally a question for the jury hnd not an obvious disregard of duty and safety
. C. 6- P.
for the court. It is always a question as amounts to misconduct,
for the jury when the measure of duty R. Co. v. McElwee, supra; N. P.R. Co.
is ordinary and reasonable care. In v. Heiltian, 49 Pa. St. 63 ; Glassey v.
such case tile measure of duty is not Hestonville 4-c. R. Co., supra. The folfixed, bat variable. Under some circum- lowing are cases of negligence per se:
stances a higher degree of care is de- Reeves v. Del., Lack. J- W1est. 1 Co.,
manded than under others. And when 30 1d. 454, held, that it was negligence
the standard shifts with the circumstances for a train to approach a public crossing,
of the case it is, in its very nature, in- on a curve and through a deep cut, at a
capable of being determined as a matter high rate of speed. 1'oicdl v. Penna.
of law, and must be submitted to tile 1. Co., 32 Id. 414, held negligence in
jury to determine what it is, and wle- defendants to use straw for bedding stock
ther it has been complied with " : WIL- in cars where there was exposure to
LIAM, J., in Vest Chester 4- Phila. R. sparks from the locomotive. Penna. R.
Co. v. .A"cElwee, 67 Pa. St. 315. See Co. v. Zebe, 33 Id. 318, where the plainalso McCully v. Clark, 40 Id. 406, per tiff's son stepped off the cars on the side
STRONG, J. ; Glassey v. ITestonville opposite the platform, and was killed by
Pass. R. Co., 57 Id. 174 ; Penna. R. a passing train. See also Penna. R. Co.
Co. v. Barnett, 59 Id. 264. It was said v. Ogier, 35 Id. 60, citing Reeves v. D.
in Catawissa It. Co. v. Armstrong, 52 Id. L. 6- I. R. Co. and Penna. B. Co. v.
286, that what acts and conduct consti- Zebe, supra. Citizens' Ins. Co. v. .afarsh,
tute negligence, or rather whether a 41 Id. 395 ; held negligence, or rather
given state of facts constitutes negli- misconduct, for the captain of a steanigence, was generally a question of law; boat, racing on the Mississippi, to stand
and in Pills., F. W. 4 C. R. Co. v. a barrel of oil of turpentine near the
Evans, 53 Id. 254, that ",pecial verdicts furnace to use upon the wood as it went
are the best machinery for determining into the fire, whereby the steamboat was
railroad cs-es, because they give all tile destroyed by fire. North Penna. R. (.
facts, both those disputed and those un- v. fleilnan, 49 Id. 60, where the plaindisputed, whereupon negligence becomes tiff approached a railroad track without
purely a question of law." However, looking out for a train. To the same
in a later case, Penna. Canal Co. v. effect is the late case of Penna. R. Co.
Bentley, 66 Id. 34, it was said by Mr. v. Beale, 30 Leg. Int. 232, affirning
Justice SstARSwoon-citing McCully v. that case, wlere SstARswooD, J., says,
Clark, supra, "It is said that the facts "There never was a nmore import.nt
were not disputed, and that upon the principle settled than that the fact of the
undisputed facts negligence was a ques- failure to stop immediately before crosstion of law. There is no such principle, ing a railroad track is not merely eviexcept where a man violates a plain dence of negligence for the jury, but
legal duty ;" and this seems to be the negligence per se, and a question for the
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court." Pitt.,hurlh 6"Conn(lsrille It. Co. prudent man would have done unler the
v. .h'Cury, 56 Pa. St. 300, where a pas- cireuinstances. In such cases the stan.enger in a railway car voluntarily put hk dard of duty anti the compliance with it,
arni outside the car window and was in- are for the jury, and cases of this kind
jured. Glassey v. Ilestonville J'c.. (o.,
are not to le taken from them, even, it
57 Id. 172, where it was held in an ac- would appear, when the facts are untion ly a parent, that he was negligent disputed : Penna. Canal Co. v. Bentley.
in law in allowing his son, less than sulra. In some cases the law defines
flor years of age, to run at large in the the measure of duty, and the province
street, without a protector. Empire of the jury is then only to find whether
Traniportation Co.v. W1amsutta Oil Co., there was performance of that duty or
63 id.14, where part of the measure of not, and they are to be so instructed. Or,
duty resting upon defendants as common if the facts are found or undisputed, the
carriers was to have perfect car-coup- court may decide upon the whole case.
lings. The defendants' oil-train caught It is only in this last class of eases that it
fire, anl by reason of a defective coup- can properly be said, as has been said in
ling the car containing plaintiff's oil many of the states, that where the facts
could not be uncoupled, but was con- are found, negligence is a question of
sumed, with its contents, although it law. It will be noticed that the cases
could otherwise have been saved. The above cited are mostly those where it
jury were instructed to find for the was a question of the plaintiff's contriplaintiff.
butory negligence. It would seem that
To show the limits of the rule in this the courts are less willing to take the
state, the following cases may be added, question of defendant's negligence from
which were, under the circumstances, the jury, and will do so only in the
held proper to go to the jury: Penna. R. plainest eases. In no eases where the
Co. v. Barnett, 59 Pa. St. 259 (where conduct of a party has been impugned
the whistle of the locomotive was not as negligent has the court instructed the
sounded at a crossing) ;
fcCully v. jury that there was no want of care;
('lark, 40 Id. 399 (where the defendants tVeil v. Express Co., 7 Phila. 245, per,
permitted a large heap of burning coal HARE, P. J.
to remain unextinguished, by which the
The remarks of Chief Justice LownrE,
plaintiff's warehouse was destroyed); in Citizens' Insurance Co. v. Harsh,
Ijett v. Phila. 4- Read. R. Co. 23 Id. supra, will not be out of place in this con373 (where firewas communicated bytlie nection : "It is for comparatively very
emission of sparks from a locomotive) ; few of the acts of our lives that the law
Johnson v. Bruner, 61 Id. 58 (where a prescribes any definite rule. It is satisservant fell through an open hatchway in fled for most matters with the general
defendant's mill) ; Johnson v. West Ches- direction to all to do the best they can,
ter 6- Phila. 1?. Co., 70 Id. 357 (where, in reasonable accordance with the cusunder peculiar circumstances, the plain- toms of society in regard to it; and it
tiff stepped on a train in motion) ; Kay approves, if the act done cannot be conv. Penna. R. Co., 65 Id. 269.
demned when measured by the standard
In cases involving the question of of ordinary care, diligence, faithfulness
negligence there are usually two ques- and skill, and allows emulation and
tions to be determined: 1st. What was good conscience to surpass that standard
the measure of duty? 2d. 'Was this as far as possible.
* * *
The law
measure complied with? Ordinarily the cannot possibly define how the mechanic
measure is what a reasonable, ordinarily shall use his tools, or i- materiel., or
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how the physician shall treat his patient,
or what acts or omissions shall constitute proper care and skill, or the want
of them, and therefore it must be contented with the loose standard of the ordinary.
Judges are not expected to
know what is proper care and skill, except in some matters of legal practice,
and we can have it defined only for each
cae as it arises, and then it is done by
a jury. * * * Hence we say that
questions of ordinary care, diligence
and skill are to be decided by the jury.
But the ordinary is not always the standard of duty; for often the law defines
the very act, and even the form of it,
that is to be done in given circumstances,
and then there is no question of care,
skill or negligence to be submitted to
the jury, but simply whether the acts
required or forbidden by the law have
been done. These views may help to
draw the distinction between negligence
or carelessness, and misconduct."
CoNNEcTIcuT.-Beers v. 1ousatonic
1?. Co., 19 Conn. 566, is a leading case.
The plaintiff's servant was driving cattle along a public highway at the time
when the cars usually passed the crossing, as known to him. The cattle were
carefully driven, in the same manner as
cattle usually are, but the driver was
too far from the crossing to be able to
reach it after the cars appeared ; many
of the cattle were injured by the train.
The defendants urged that these ficts,
which were undisputed, constituted negligence in law on the plaintiff's part.
The case was, however, left to the jury,
who foundfor the plaintiff, and a motion
for a new trial was refused. STORRS,
J., said, in delivering the opinion of the
court: "The court could not have pronounced that those circumstances proved
the existence of negligence, or a want
of due care, on the part of the plaintiff,
without encroaching on the rights of the
jury. * * * Whether there was
negligence or a want of care of whatever

degree, was, from its very nature, a
question of fact." This case was followed in Park v. O'Brien, 23 Conn.
339, where the court refused to consider the act of the plaintiff in leaving
a spirited horse unhitched and unattended
in the street, as concurrent negligence
in law. The respective provinces of
court and jury in cases of this kind
are clearly shown in Bill v. ,Smith,
39 Conn. 206, an action for injury
caused to plaintiff's dredging-machine,
while at anchor, by defendant's propeller. "Negligence, in a legal sense,
is the omission of some duty imposed by
law ; the law determines what the duty
is ; the evidence in the cause determines
whether it has been omitted. The former
is a question for the court, the latter
for the jury. To illustrate: The law
requires that when two persons in carriages meet each other upon the highway, each shall turn to the right. Whether he does so or not is a question offact.
The law requires that a man shall in all
cases act with reasonable care ; what is
reasonable care, and whether a man so
acts, are questions offact." That is,
the part of a jury is simply to finl
whether there was compliance with the
measure of duty, that measure of duty
being in most cases reasonable care, and
in the smaller number of cases some more
specific line of conduct laid down by the
court as a rule of law. In Knight v.
Goodyear .fanf. Co., 38 Conn. 438,
where defendants' steam factory whistle
made a "terrific, discordant and startling " sound which frightened the plaintiff's horse, a quiet animal, judgment was
entered on a case stated for the plaintiff
NEW I sPsHtn.-" Negligence isa
mixed question of law and fact to be
settled by the jury under the instruction.
of the court" : Norris v. Litchfidd, 35
N. H. 277. See a full discussion of
authorities in the very late case of Stale
V. ranrh.
4- Lawr. R. Co., 52 Id. 5o2.
"VER31ONT.-Negligence is held to hc
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ulUestion of law and fact, but v. IT'ilkiason, 30 Md. 233, where the
a mix
where the Inets are admitted, it becomes plaintiff stepped off a street car at the
a fluetioal of law: irlqqs v. Talor, 28 front end and was injured: the Court
Vt. 18:3, per RNDFItAt.D, Cl. J., where of Appeals held that the jury should
it %as helhl negligence in law for a dc- have been instructed to find contributory
puty slieriff to leave a carriage which he negligence. Similarly held in North Cent.
ha, levied upon, exposed to the weather 1.1 Co. v. Price, 29 Md. 440, an ably
from September to April. So in Trowt I-. argt(d case, where the equitable plainIli. (at. P. 0.,24 Vt. 497, anaction for tiff's husband was struck and apparently
running over plaintiff's horse while at killed by a train of cars and by gross
large, it was helu that if thejury found neglect, left locked tip in defendants'
that the horse was on tle highway by station-house where he bled to death. The
hi6,nwner's clisent, they should, as a defendants were held negligent in law.
matter of law, have been told to find for In Balt. , ' 0. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 35
the defendant. Where there is no evi- Id. 32, the plaintiff, a lad of eleven
,hu'uec
(if negligence, the court must so years, came to a street-crossing where a
iuutract the jury ; or inutt find negli- train was being made up, and seeing an
getue in law, if the facts necessary to opening of five fect in width. attempted to
e-tabli.lh it are undisputed : Barber v. run through, but was caught and injured.
E'suex, 27 Vt. 70; see also Robinson v. The question arose as to whether his
nets constituted contributory negligence.
(ne, 22 Vt. 225.
(;coa A.-Thhe Code gives a legal The court, in holding that the case
s
definition of extraordinary diligence, was rightly left to the jury, said, "Thi
being the conduct of "very prudent and court has too often decided to be required
thouglful persons in preserving their again to repeat, that the question of
own property." Held, under this defi- negligence or the want of ordinary care
nition, that " the judge has no right to in eases like the present, is one of fact
determine what constitutes negligence:" for the jury." In another part of the
F'iyit v. Geo. R. 6- Banking Ca., 34 opinion it was said, "we do not desire
Geo. 338, where the injury was caused it to he understood that in our opinion
li a worn-out rail on defendants' track, there are no eases where the question of
by which a train was thrown from the negligence could be properly one of law
track. To the same etbect are lVrallace for the court. Far from it. Many such
v. Chlajon, 42 Id. 443, and .acon . cases could be suggested, though they
R Co. v. lWinn, 26 Geo. 250.
B.
are not of frequent occurrence ; but such
MAARLAND.-The question has been cases alvays present some prominent
much discussed in this state. The lan- and decisive act, in regard to the nature
guage of the court in the principal case and character of which no room is left
ii taken from Bait. 4- 0. B. Co. v. for ordinary minds to differ." In Ball.
O. R. Co. v. Dougherty, 36 Id. 366,
0'
ShiPley, 31 Md. 368, the two cases being
not unlike. Where there is no legal Dougherty was killed by a locomotive
standard or measure of duty, or where while walking along the railroad track
the facts are numerous and complicated, at night. It was held, two justices disthe question of negligence is to be sub- senting, that the case had been properly
mitted to the jury; but where the legal left to tie jury. In this ease all the
duty imposed upon the plaintiff is clear earlier authorities were reviewed.
MAssACtusTTrs.-In this state the
and well defined, a failure to perform it
will, if found by the jury, constitute plaintiff, in actions for negligence, is
negligence in law. Balt. Pass. R. Co. held in every case to show affirmatively
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the exercise of due care (Gaynor v. Old parties.
Col. R. Co., 100 Mass. 211 ; Gahagan v.
Boston 6- Lowell R. Co., I Allen 190), a
rule which, it would appear, has the effect
of withdrapving many cases of this sort
frori the lecision of the jury, because
if the absence of negligence is not
clearly proven by the plaintiff the court
will either grant a nonsuit or direct verdict for the defendants. In Gavett v. Man.
4- Lawr. R. Co., 16 Gray 501, the plaintiff, a woman of seventy years of age,
stepped from the train while in motion
and was injured; the court directed a
verdict for the defendants. The Supreme

Court, per

BIGELOW,

C. J., said:-

"There was therefore no proof of due
care, and no facts were shown from
which any inference of such care could
by possibility be drawn by reasonable
men, which would support a verdict for
Similarly in Lucas v.
the plaintiff."
New Beedf. 4- Taunton R. .Co., 6 Gray
64. " When, therefore," said HOAR,
J., in Gahagan v. Boston 4- Low. R. Co.,
supra, "a p1laitiff offers no evidence
that he was in the exercise of care, but,
on the contrary, the whole evidence on
which his case rests shows that he was
careless, we have held that the court
may rightfully instruct the jury as a
matter of law, that the action cannot be
maintained." In this case the plaintiff's
intestate attempted to cross between two
freight-cas shackled together and moving slowly. So in Callahan v. Bean, 9
Allen 401, where the plaintiff, two years
and four months old, was held to be
guilty of contributory negligence in
being allowed to go unattended across
a public street-a decision of great hardship, and one which, in view of all its
circumstances, it is believed (and hoped)
is not generally followed by other courts.
In Todd v. Old Col. R. Co., 3 Allen 21,
the fact that plaintiff's arm was outside
the car window at the time of the accident was alone held to-preclude recovery.
So held in another appeal by the same

Same v. Same, 7 Allen 2118.
In Gaynor v. Old Col. R. Co., 100 Mass.
212, COLT, J., laid down the rule thus :
"When the circumstances under which
the plaintiff acts are complicated and the
general knowledge and experience of men
do not at once condemn his conduct as careless, it is plainly to be submitted to the
jury. What is ordinary care in such
case, even though the facts are undisputed, is peculiarly a question of fact.
It is the judgment and experience of
the jury, and not of the judge, which is
In Sonthworth v.
to he appealed to."
Old Col. 6- Newport R. Co., 105 Id. 344,
it was held not negligence in law for the
plaintiff to leave his horse unfastened
and unattended in the street. See also
M-uhoney v. Metropolitan R. Co., 104 Id.
73, and Fox v. Sadcett, 10Allen 535.
NEW Yonu.-In the early case of
Foot v. lViswall, 14 Johns. 304, an action for running foul of the plaintiff's
sloop at night, it was held that the facts

were exclusively for the jury ; whether
they would, when ascertained, warrant
the charge of negligence, was a matter
of law.

But in Ireland v. Plank Road

Co., 3 Kern. 533, it was held that it by
no means necessarily followed because
there was no conflict of testimony, that
the court was to decide the issue between
the parties as a question of law. Both
cases were left to the jury. So in Pur.
vis v. Coleman, I Bosw. 326, negligence
was said to be commonly called, "though
improperly," a mixed qucstion.-to be
found by the jury unler instructionq.
However, the court said, in Keller v. N.
Y. Central R. Co., 24 How. Pr. R. 176,
"The question of negligence in all cases
involves a question of fact, and it is only
when the question of fact is free from all
doubt that the court has a right to
apply the law without the action of the
jury," citing Bernhardt v. Renss. 4Saratoga R. Co., 32 Harr. 165, to the
same point. And in a later appeal of
this same case, 23 How. Pr. R. 168,
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J., iued the following Ian-

though there was evidence of defendants
having been negligent. So in Htaring
v. JN. Y. 6-' .B. Co., 13 Barb. 9, where
ho clear and irresistible that the court tihe plaintiff drove across the track at the
wouhl he ju-tificd in assuming, without rate of a mile in about four minutes,
question to the jury, that approaching time track between high emsubmitting tb,.
negligecue waq e-tablishcd. Atthe same bankments. There was negligence on
time, it mu-t he obvious that such cases defendants' part, but a motion to set
must be r.;re." And again " It would aside a nonsuit was denied. So where
not be cay to suppose a case," &c. In plaintiff drove across a track on a trot,
accordance with this doctrine we find it without taking any precaution to learn
held to e neizligence per se to allow a wheler a train was approaching, it was
child of fitir years to go unattended in held that he ought to have been nonthe street : .langamn v. Brooklyn R. Co., suited: Dascomb v. BuF. J- State Line
36 Barb. 230. So of a child seventeen .R. Co., 27 Barb. 22. See also Davis v.
months o1, (though here there was not N. 3. C. B. Co., 47 N. Y. 400 ; Ddanegligence on ,leudant's part, and this find v. 1try Co., 5 Rob. 207, and
point was it ditumn), Kreig v. W'ells, I Willis v. long isd. R. Co., 34 N.Y. 616.
MmCmnAV.-Negligence is a quesE. D. Str.ith 74, (though not so held of
a child eihht years old : Drew v. Sixth tion of' fat, but where negligence on the
Av. R. Co., 26 N. Y. 49; nor of a plaintiff's part is the only inference that
child three years old, in charge of a can be drawn from the evidence, the jury
sister nine and a half years old : Al v. may be instructed to find for the defendForty-secnd .qtreet R. Co., 47 Id. 317 ; ant: Delroit 4- Ailw. R. Ch. v. Van
nor of onilsbx years old: Cosqrove v. Sleilurq. 17 Mich. 99. A person about
Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255). In Spxton v. to pass a railroad track is bound to asZelt, 44 N. Y. 430, proof of fact that certain whether a train is approaching;
the defendant dug.ma ditch across a pub- if he f'ails to do so, but ventures blindly
lic sidewalk and allowed it to remain on time track, his conduct is negligence
open in the oight-time, with no provision in law: Lake Shore J- Mfich. Smth. R.
for warning travellers, establishes neg- Co. v. Millr, 25 Id. 274.
ligence us a matter of law. In PhilDELAWAE -Negligence
is a quesUps v. Ileans. J- Saratoga R. Co., 57 tion of 'iuet f'or the jury: Burton v.
Barb. 652, it was said that ordinarily Phila., lVihmn. 4- Bait. R. Co., 4 Harr.
to get upon a train while in motion is 252.
negligonce pers,',
but that circumstances
NEaA SKA.-It is the duty of the
may justify doing so, as was the case court to tell tile jury what facts will
there. So in iler v. N. 1. C. R. Co., amount to negligence, and to leave it to
49 N. Y. 47. In Tlrinqs v. Central the jury to find whether such facts have
Park R. Co., 7 Rob. 616, the plain- been found or not: leyer v. Midland
tiff, a boy, was injured while attempt- Pac. 1R Co., 2 Nebr. 319.
ing to get on a train in motion. There
ILLtNOI.-Negligence is a question
were no palliating circumstances; a of fact, except where it consists hi the
nonsnit was therefore ordered. In Brooks omission of a duty imposed by positive
r. Buf. 4- Niagara R. Co., 25 Barb. requirement of law: Toledo, Peoria 4"
600, where plaintiff drove his team
rarsaw R. Co. v. Foster, 43 I1. 41.7,
upon the track and stopped there to where the question arose its to whether
s e'if a train was coming, it was held a locomotive whistle should have been
error not to have nonsuited him, al- sounded or not at a crossing. See also
VOL. XXII.-20
SIELDE.',

"C-tv may no doubt arise in
which tile
prof of, negligence would be
guage:
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Gal. d Chicago R. Co. v. Dill, 22 Id.
271, and Chi. 4-Rock Is. R. Co. v.
McKean, 40 Id. 218. Where a parent
allowed a child of four years of age to
go unattended on the street, Chicago v.
Magor, 18 Id. 349 ; and where defendants allowed dry grass to accumulate
upon their right of way, .ll. Cent. R. Co.
v. Nunn, 51 Id. 78; S. P., 0. & 3l. R.
Co. v. Shawfelt, 47 Id. 497 ; see Pfau v.
Reynolds, 53 Id. 212. It seems to have
been held negligence in law to run a train
of cars at a high rate of speed through the
. street of a village: Chi. 6-Alton R. Co.
v. Gregory, 58 Id. 226. The practice
in Illinois of assigning for error the
refusal of the court below to grant a
new trial, obliges the Court of Apliea1
to discuss questions of both law and fact
and renders it difficult in these cases to
distinguish between evidence upon which
the jury would be allowed to find negligence, and negligence per se: see Chi.
'4-Alton R. Co. v. Quaintance, 57 Id.
389.
TENssE.-Where the defendants,
owners of a steam paper-mill, left two
cogwheels running, about two feet above
the ground, and twenty feet from a street,
-without any cover, guard or enclosure
-whatever, and with no one in charge
-of them, notwithstanding the fact that
-children were in the habit of playing
about every day, and the plaintiff, a
-child three years of age, was caught in
the wheels and crushed, it was held, that
-the court ought to have instructed the
jury, as a matter of law, to find for the
-plaintiffs- Whirely v. Whiteman, I Head.
'"610.
WiscoNstm-Negligence is a conclusion of fact to be drawn by the jury,
under the instruction of the court. But
-where there is an entire absence of proof
-of negligence, or where the plaintiff's
-own proof shows negligence on his part, a
,nonsuit is properly ordered: Laughoff
'v. Milw. 4- P. du C. R. Co., 19 Wise.
.497, where, upon appeal from a nonsuit,

it was held that the jury should have
been allowed to decide whether a woman
was negligent in trying to cross before
two trains which were unlawfully racing
through the main street of a town. In
Spencer v. Same, 17 Id. 487, the plaintiff had his arm outside the car window
and was injured; held, that he was not
negligent in law for so doing. In
Rothe v. Milto. 4- St. P. 1. Co., 21 Id.
256, where the plaintiff came down the
steps of a mill upon a railroad track,
with two bags of grain on his shoulder
and was run over, and at the trial was
nonsuited, there seems to have been no
negligence on the part of defendants.
The act of the defendants' servants in
making a "running switch" in the
populous part of a town, with no person in charge on the front end of the
loose cars, was held negligence in law:
Butler v. Same, 28 Id. 487. A'dlo!Lq v.
Chicago 4- N. TV. R. Co., 26 Id.229,
followed the Illinois cases, supra, in
holding it not negligence per se, to allow
dry grass to accumulate on the way of
a railroad. See also Detroit 6- Milo.
B. Co. v. Curtis, 23 Id. 152.
UNITED STATES.-SiOUX City 4- P.
R. Co. v. Stout, is a very recent case,
17 Wall. 637, HUNT, J., there says: "It
is true that where the facts are undisputed
the effect of them is for the judgment of
the court and not for the decision of the
jury. This is true in that class of cases
where the existence of such facts comes in
question, rather titan where inferences or
deductions are to be made from the facts.
* * * In some cases too the necessary
inference from the proof is so certain
that it may be ruled as a question of
law. If a sane man voluntarily throws
himself in contact with a passing train,
there being nothing to counteract the
effect of this action, it may be ruled as
a matter of law that the injury to him
resulted from his own fault. * * So
if a coach driver intentionally drives
within a few inches of a precipice, and
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an accident happens, negligence may be
ruled as a question of law. On the
other hand if lie had placed a suitable
distance between his coach aid tile procipice, but by the breaking of a new
iron axle, which could not have been

anticipated, an injury occurred, it might
he ruled as a question of law that there

was

no negligence and no liability.

But these arc extreme cases. The range
between them is almost infinite in
variety and extent. It is in relation to
these intermediate cases that the opposite

rule prevails. Upon the facts proven
in such cases, it is a matter of judgment
and discretion, of sound inference, what
is the deduction to be drawn from the
undisputed facts. Certain facts we may
presume to be clearly established from

which one sensible, impartial man would
infer that negligence existed ; another

man equally sensible and equally impartial would infer that there was no
negligence.
It is this class of cases,
and those akin to it that the law commits to the decision of a jury. Twelve
men of the average of the community,
comprising men of education and men
of little education, men of learning, and
men whose learning consists only in
what they have themselves seen and
heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the
farmer, the laborer, these sit together,
consult, apply their separate experience
of the afithirs of life to the ficts found,
and draw an unanimous conclusion.
This average judgment thus given it is
the great effort of the law to obtain. It
is assumed that twelve men know more
of the common affairs of life than does
one man, that they can draw wiser and
safer conclusions from admitted facts
thus occurring than can a single judge.
* **
We find, though not uniform or
harmonious, that the authorities justify
us in holding in the case before us, that
although the facts are unlisputed, it is
for the jury and not for the judge to
determine whether proper care was given,
or whether they establish negligence."

was said by Lord
in Tobin v. 111orrison, Moore
1'. C. 126, that "The matter of law and
the matter of fact must be kept separate ; without the severance of the two
neighboring provinces of judge and
jury, the trial by jury cannot in any
intelligible and consistent sense be sail
to exist * * yet in the present instance,
the action being for negligence, the
special verdict finds facts and leaves the
court to say whether negligence has or
not been proved. Negligence is a question of fact, not of law, and should have
been disposed of by the jury." The
numerous discussions in the English
courts on the subject of negligence, all
seem to arise upon the question whether
there was any evidence of negligence to
go to the jury. See for example, Smitlh
v. London 4- S. TV. By. Co., L. R. 5
C. 1'. 98, where upon a verdict for plaintiff with leave to enter a motion for
nonsuit, if the court should be of opinion
that there was no evidence of negligence
which ought to have been submitted to
the jury, the court complains thqt
"great difficulty -is thrown upon, the
judges, who are called upon to determine questions of this sorti which make
them too much judges of facts." In all
cases the English courts seem to adhere
strictly to the maxim, Ad qucestionem
facti non respondent judices, ad qu(estiopen legis non respondent juratores:
Broom Leg. 'Max. 102. In Patterson
v. I1'allace,
1 McQueen II. of L. Ca.,
there was no controversy about the facts,
but only a question whether certain facts
proved established negligence.
Tie
judge at the trial withdrew the case
from the jury, but it was held to be a
pure question of fact for the jury andl
the judgment was reversed.
This summary of the deciqions. in .
America and England, shows that in
most cases the question of negligenceis
one to be submitted to the jury, upon the question of reasonable care under
all the circumstances of the case.
ENGLAND.-It

BROUGHAt

APPEAL OF BELLE D. FOSTER.
Evidence Df gross acts of carelessness, and entire disregard of safety has,
however, in some of the states been held
to withqraw cases fror the province of
the jury. These are upually upon the
part of the plaintiff. The policy of this
rule may be doubted; it is not too much
to say that it ought not to be extended
beyond narrow limits. If the evidence
of negligence is such as shocks the mind
of the court, it is not likely that twelve
reasonable men will find ordinary care
on the plaintiffs part, and all such
questiou-, it is thought, can safely be
left to them. To "confuse the province
of the court with that of the jury will
result, it is feqred,, in introducing uncertainty into the law, and in a consequent increase of litigations; as can be
readily shown by the number of cases
in the books in which an appeal has
been taken for the refusal of the court
to decide upon negligence as a matter
,of law where the jury has found that
there was no negligence, or in which
the court has held the measure of duty
too strongly against a party, and withrawn the case'from the'jury.
In cases where the law has imposed
- plairl dtityupon a person,lpther than
the tsual one of ordinary, reasonable
care under all 'the circunpJgqgpes of the

case, cases might, more properly, be
withdrawn from the jury upon undisputed
facts. These, it is suggested, are usually cases in which the duty is one arising out of some public relationship to
other persons, as that of railroad companies to passengers, where the measure of duty is not ordinary care, but
something much more definite and specific, and capable of exact legal definition. There the court defines the duty,
and the jury have only to find compliance or not. If the measure of duty is
simply a -proper regard for one's own
safety, or one's own property, there can
be no standard but ordinary care. The
]est tribunal to decide that question,
whether the facts are disputed or not, is
the jury.
The words of one of the judges and
sages of the law, may often be called to
mind with profit : "It is of the greatest
consequence to the law of England, and
to the subject, that the powers of the
judge and jury be kept distinct ; that
the judge determine the law, and the
jury the fact; and if ever they come to
be confounded, it will prove thi confusion and the destruction of the law of
England :" Lord HARDWICKE, in Rex.
V. Poole, Cases temp. Hard. 28.
F. R.

Rfp'eme Court of Pennsflvania.
APPEAL OF IBELLE D. FOSTER.
Where partners pihrchase real estate with the money of the firm as partnership
property, upon the .gettigtuent of the.partnership business brought about by the
death of onk of the members of the firm, the proceeds of the sale of the inteiest
of the decpasqd partner in such real estate is. to be regarded as land remaining in
-specie, after discharging its liabilities as partnership stock; and the widow of
pX4t glaceased partner is entitled to an interest therein for her life only.

JOHN FOSTER died in August 1871, intestate. He left surviving him a widow, the appellant Belle D. Foster, who administered upon his estate, and five children. At the time of his death,
and prior thereto, said John Foster and Samuel M. Kier were
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partners in the business of mining and selling coal. The firm
owned considerable real estate, the conveyances to them being in
some instances as partners, and in others as tenants in common;
but all the purchases were made with partnership funds and for
partnership purposes, and the real estate was so held and used
by the firm at the time of Foster's death. At the dissolution of
the firm in consequence of the death of Foster, the partnership
was largely indebted, but upon an appraisement of all the property of the firm, made by the surviving partner, it was found that
after deducting the partnership liabilities, and the individual liabilities of Foster to the firm, the net interest of the latter was
worth $25,508.30; and an application was made to the Orphans' Court by his widow, as administratrix, and the guardian of
his minor children, for leave to sell and convey his interest in the
firm, lands and personalty, to the surviving partner, Samuel M.
Kicr, for said appraised value, in accordance with the provisions
of the Act of April 18th 1853. The court decreed a sale as
prayed for, and further decreed that the widow should receive the
interest of' one-third of the purchase-money during her life, and
that the residue should go to the children of the decedent. From
this latter part of the decree, which restricted the right of the
widow to the interest merely of one-third of the principal during
her life instead of adjudging it to her absolutely, she took this
appeal.
MZ.IV. Acheson, for the appellant.
Thomas .Ewing, for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, J.-The question raised upon this record may be
thus concisely stated: When real estate has been held as Ilartaership stock-the firm dissolved by the death of one of the members
-a settlement and balance ascertained to be due by the surviving
partner to the estate of the deceased, is such balance as far as derived from the sale of the realty to be distributed as real or personal estate ?

The appellant, who is the widow of John Foster.

deceased, who was a copartner of Samuel l. Kier in the firm of
Kier & Foster, claims that she is entitled to one-third of the interest of the said Foster, as ascertained by the settlement, absolutely
as personal estate; the decree of the court below awards it to
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her for life only as realty. The firm property at the time of Foster's death was composed both of lands and movables. They
were engaged in the mining and selling of coal. The appellant,
as administratrix, and William W. Young, as guardian of the
minor children of John Foster, presented a petition to the Orphans' Court of Allegheny county, setting forth " that at the time
of his death, the said John Foster was an equal partner with
Samuel M. Kier in the firm of Kier & Foster, engaged in the
mining and selling of coal, the property of the said firm being
situated in the county of Allegheny; that while in many instances
the real estate belonging to the said firm was conveyed to them as
tenants in common, yet the same was really held by and purchased
with the money of the firm as partnership property; that the said
firm of Kier & Foster were largely indebted; that Kier, the surviving partner, had proposed to purchase the interest of Foster
for the sum of $25,508.30, he, the said Kier, assuming all the
debts and liabilities of the firm; that it would be greatly to the
advantage of all interested that the interest of Foster should be
sold at private instead of public sale, and the proposition of Kier
accepted; that they unite in the petition for the purpose of removing any question which may arise from the fact that several
of the said properties have been conveyed to the said John Foster
and Samuel M. Kier as tenants in common, and not expressly as
partners." Upon this petition the Orphans' Court decreed a private sale to Samuel M. Kier for the sum named, and that the
proceeds of sale be treated and considered as the proceeds of real
estate, and accordingly distributing and applying the purchasemoney between the widow and heirs of decedent. It is from this
latter part of the decree that this appeal is taken.
It has not been and cannot be denied, upon the appraisement
and settlement of the partnership debts and assets which accompanies the petition, that after discharging all the liabilities of the
firm, the interest of Foster in the lands and real estate which
formed the most considerable portion of the stock was fairly represented by the sum agreed to be paid for his entire interest. It
is the well-settled rule in marshalling the assets of a decedent, that
the personal property is to be first applied in the payment of debts.
The general principle is that the personal estate is the proper fund
for that purpose, and shall be first applied even to the payment
of debts with which the real estate is charged: Keyzey's Case, 9
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S. & R. 71 ; lValker's .state, 3 Rawle 237 ; Cadbury v. Duval;
10 Barr 273. This is indeed the unbending rule of our statute
law, for no order can be made by the Orphans' Court authorizing
an executor or administrator to make sale of real estate for the
payment of debts unless it shall appear that the personal assets are
insufficient for the purpose: Act of February 24th 1834, sec. 20,
Pamph. L. 80; Act of March 29th 1832, see 31, Pampli. L.
198. It is true, that it may often happen that where personal
property is used in connection with a colliery or manufacturing
establishment, it is very much for the interest of all parties
that it should be sold together. That is a difficulty which
seems inherent in the subject-equally applicable to the property
of any decedent-not peculiar to one whose property is an interest
in partnership stock. It seems to be considered as well settled,
that where land is a part of partnership stock, it at no time-not
even during the continuance of the partnership-becomes personalty in such an unqualified sense as to give one partner an implied
power to dispose of the whole partnership interest in it. As regards the power of disposition, land held as partnership stock is
not subject to the rule which makes each partner the agent of the
firm. Neither can sell more than his own undivided interest, unless
he have from the other a sufficient special authority for the purpose.
This seems to be the inevitable result of the Statute of Frauds, both
as to legal and equitable interests or estates : .Murp y v. ffubert,
7 Barr 423; Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Brock. 457; Tapley v.
Butterfeld, 1 Metc. 515. It follows, that the surviving partner
could not sell the real estate in conjunction with the personalty.
When such a difficulty presents itself, it must be met either by a
separate sale of the personalty, or in the mode resorted to in this
case. Here we have practically no difficulty growing out of the
necessary intermixture of realty and personalty.
For all the purposes of the question before us, this case must
therefore be considered the same as if after dissolution by the
death of one partner, and payment of all partnership debts, and
any balance due the surviving partner, there had remained in
specie, unconverted, land, the interest of the deceased partner in
which is ascertained to be worth $25,508.30. Is the land thus remaining unconverted and in specie to be regarded, for the purposes
of distribution under the intestate laws, as real or personal?
This is an entirely new question in this state. It was supposed
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to arise in 3Ieily et al. v. Wood, 21 P. F. Smith 488, but this
court thought otherwise, and distinctly declined to express any
opinion upon it. A careful examination of all our determimtions
has failed to discover either decision or even dietanm bearing upon,
the point. Even Abbott's Appeal, 14 Wright 234, which has been
In that case,
pressed upon us as an authority, is inapplicable.
although the balance of a fund in court arising from the sale of
partnership real estate on an execution against the firm, was
awarded to the surviving partners as against the claim of one of
them in his own right, and as the executor of a deceased partner,
to aliquot shares ; yet as stated in the decree, these surviving
partners were "settling the business of the firm," and it is said
in the opinion by Mr. Justice READ, that "the business of the
firm, dissolved by the death of George Abbott, has never been
finally settled, and it is alleged by the appellees that the firm is
We approach the determination of the
still largely indebted."
question, therefore, untrammelled by any authority. Nor will it
be necessary to pass in review the fluctuating and discordant opinions in England and our sister states. We are saved this labor
by the learned and exhaustive opinion of Chancellor WALWORTH,
in .Biehan.v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. 165. We are at entire
liberty to resolve this important and interesting problem on principle and reason.
Conversion, is altogether a doctrine of equity. In law it has no
being. It is admitted only for the accomplishment of equitable
.results. It may be termed an equitable fiction, and the legal maxim
in fietione jUris semper subsistit equitas, has redoubled force in
application to it. It follows of necessity, that it is limited to its
end. Lord ELDON advanced this idea while his mind was evidently
laboring and in suspense on the general subject. In Ripley v.
Waterworth, 7 Yes. 425, he said: "There is an obvious difference
from all the cases, which establish this general principle, that where
a person dealing upon his own property only, has directed a conversion for a particular special purpose, or out and out, but the
produce to be applied tb a particular purpose, when the purpose
fails, the intention fails; and this court regards him as not having
There must be some purpose recognised
directed the conversion."
as lawful to be accomplished by a conversion before equity will
permit it to have place. Surely it will not be pretended that a
man could by a mere declaration of record convert his'laud into
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personalty, so as to defeat the lien of mortgages, judgments and
other encumbrances, elude the provisions of the Statute of Frauds,
and change the course of distribution in case of intestacy. If, however, a trust is created, either by deed or will, with an absolute
direction to sell and distribute the proceeds either among creditors
or other.s, equity considers thlat as actually done which has been
directed to be done, in order to accomplish the lawful intent of the
grantor or testator. If it continued land, subject as such to sale,
mortgage and encumbrance by the eventual distributees-the present cestuis que trust-the result aimed at might be defeated, and
the intention frustrated. So where land is, by the agreement of
the partners, made partnership stock, it is an out-and-out conversion only because otherwise the objects of the partnership would
be defeated, if the sale, mortgage or encumbrance of his separate
interest by one partner could prevent the equity of the other partners to have the partnership property applied to the payment of
the partnership debts, and the balances which might be due to them
respectively. When the purpose of conversion is attained, conversion ends, or more accurately, reconversion takes place. Thus
when the sale under the trust is made, the character of personalty
does not follow theland into time hands of the purchaser. The proceeds are personalty and are distributed as such among the ecstuis
que trust, because that was the very ob ect of the conversinn. So
with land in partnership when sold by the firm, the land becomes
land again in the hands of the purchaser, and the proceeds personalty, but personalty to what extent ? " Only to the extent of accomplishing the purposes of the conversion, namely, the equity of the
partners to have the joint debts and their own advances paid before
any part goes to the other partners or their separate creditors.
In Dyer v. Cornell, 4 Barr 359, where by order of the Orphans'
Conrt the land of minors was sold for their maintenance and education, it was held that the proceeds, supposing them to retain the
character of land, lose that and become personalty on the first transmission, though to an infant. The administrator of tim nmior was
decided to be entitled to the money as money. Time court, indeed,
were of opinion that the sale ipso facto worked a trans.mntation, but
they added, by COULTER, J., "But even admitting that the money
in this case bore the impress of real estate, and the inheritale qualities peculiar to lands and houses, in analogy to the case or Lloyd
v. Irart, 2 Barr 473, for how many generations or descents
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shall it wear that complexion ? It must cease as it mingles with
other moneys of the distributee, otherwise uncertainty, confusion
and litigation will indelibly mark its character. This court is of
opinion that it cannot be carried further than the first descent, in
any case." The same question is pertinent in regard to the land
in the present case. If land, remaining in specie after the partnership is dissolved and wound up, and all the purposes of its conversion answered, is still personal estate, how long is it to remain
so? Certainly all the forms of the law as to realty must be
observed in its transmission from hand to hand, and shall it not be
subject to the lien of judgments in the lifetime, and debts upon the
decease of its owner? If not, uncertainty, confusion and litigation will indelibly mark its character. But it may be asked, when
is the precise moment of its reconversion? The answer is, the
moment the partnership is wound up, either by decree, judgment or agreement, and it is determined that it no longer forms a
part of the partnership stock, and is not required for its purposes.
In Burr v. Sim, 1 Whart. 252, where land was ordered to be converted by will, and the proceeds to be paid to a legatee, it was held
that the election by the legatee before any sale, to take the land
as land, operated as a new acquisition. It was a purchase of it as
land by a suriender of the right which he undoubtedly had to consider it as money. Where, then, a partnership is dissolved, wound
up, and completely ended, what can it be but an election of the
land as land, and the reconversion of it?
It must be remarked, alsothat without the order of the Orphans' Court in this case, the legal title of John Foster to an
undivided moiety of the lands could not have been conveyed to
Samuel M. Kier. We have seen that this is a well-settled point.
If it were not Fo, the appellant as administratrix might have
assigned it. She joined in the application to the court with the
guardian. The decree for the private sale was under the provision of the Act of April 18th 185.3, see. 4, Pamph. L 505; and
the fifth section of that act has declared that in all cases of sale
according to its provisions, "The purchase-money * * * shall in
all respects be substituted for the real estate sold * * as regards
the enjoyment and ownership thereof, after the payment of liens,
and shall be held for or applied to the use and benefit of the same
persons, and for the same estate and interest * * * as the real
estate sold had been held." Under the express provision of the
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statute, the proceeds of the real estate sold under this order must
be considered as of the same character as the land remaining in
specie after discharging its liabilities as partnership stock. On
the whole, then, we are of the opinion that the appellant was only
entitled to an interest for her life, and that the decree of the court
below was right.
Decree affirmedY and appeal dismissed at the cost of the appellant.
The question presented in the foregoing case, as was said by the learned
judge who delivered the opinion, is an
entirely new question in Pennsylvania,
while the decisions in England and the
American sister states are fluctuating
ant discordant.
I. In England, it was formerly held that
the real estate of a partnership should
be treated as partnership effects, and
subject to the rules regulating the distribution of personal property: Jeffereys
v. Small, 1 Vernon 217 ; Lake v. Craddocrk, 3 P. Wins. 158; Gow on Part.
50-288. The only departure was in
regard to the claims of the widow and
heirs of a deceased partner, as in Thornton v. Dixon, 3 Brown's Ch. Cas. 199;
and even in cases of this kind, Lord
Tiua Low recognised the general principle, as he did also in Lyster v. Dollard,
I Vesey, Jr. 435, and Sir WILLIAM
GRANT held the same views in Bell v.
Phyn, 7 Vesey 453, and Balmain v.
Shore, 9 Vesey 500. But even this exception was subsequently withdrawn,
and it is now finally settled in England
that real estate of a partnership is to be
considered and treated as personal property as regards all persons, whether
partners, creditors, heirs or personal
representatives, and that on the death-of
a partner, his interest in such real estate
goes to his personal representatives,
unless there is something in the partnership articles to give it a different direction: see Montague on Partnership,
App. 97-164; Selkrigg v. Davies, 2
])ow's Parl. Cases 231 ; Phillips v.
Phillips, I Myl. & Keene 649 ; Broom Y.

Broom, 3 Id. 443; Houghton v. Houghton,
11 Sim. 491; Morris v. Kearsley, 2
Younge & Coil. 139 ; Darby v. Darby,
3 Drewry 495; Ripley v. lraterworth,
7 Vesey 425; Fssex v. Essex, 20 Beav.
442 ; Collyer on Part.,
148 ; Bissex
on Part. 55 ; Lindley on Part. 566.
And the rule was recognised in Ireland: In re Thomas Ryan, 3 Irish Equity
Rep. (New Series 1868-9) at page 232.
But where partners after the termination
of the partnership, continued to treat
the real property which had been purchased by the firm, as real estate, as was
shown by their renting it to a new firm,
Lord LANGDALE later held, that upon
the death of one of the members of the
old firm, his beneficial interest in such
real estate was in equity to be treated as
real estate, and that it went to the heir'
at law: Rowley v. Adams, 7 Beav. 548 ;
and see also Randall v. Randall, 7 Sim.
271. A good reason for this ruling might
be deduced from the fact that the real estate in thatcase was not required for the
payment of partnership debts, butwas the
surplus of the partnership which had not
creditors between whom and the partners
there were any equities to subserve ; or
that the partners had tacitly agreed to
consider the surplus real estate as an investment, or had elected to take and
hold such real estate as land, as was
done by the legatee in Burr v. Sir, I
Wharton 252 (referred to in the foregoing opinion), who elected to take as
real estate, the land ordered to be converted by will and its proceeds paid to
the legatee. And even real estate of a
firm expressly declared in the deed to be
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considered as personal estate, was in a
later case held to support in the several
members of the firm an equitable freefiold sulffcient to entitle them to vote as
freeholders ; a stretch of judicial constiuction in the interest of electoral
privileges, which added electors as another class of persons to be noticed when
.considering the subject: Baxter v. Newman, I Lutw. Regist. Cases 287. But
Chief Justice TiNDtAL.in delivering the
opinion of the court in that case, distinctly recognised the general rule that
4 court of equity treats real property as
if it were personal estate, in order to
carry out the intention of the partners.
IL In the United States thb decisions
have fluctuated, although it is not diffiqult to determine from them that the
weight of 'the authority establishes the
rule that the real estate of a partnership,
bought with partnership funds, for partnership purposes, is in equity to be
treated as partnership effects, chargeable
with the debts of the firm and with any
balance .which may be due from one
partner to another. It has been so held
in Maine in the case of Smith v. Jones, 3
Fairfield 337 ; and Chief Justice W xsToe doubted whether this was not to be
controlled by statute: Blake v. Nulter,
1 Appleton 19. And the general principle was affirmed in Bufua v. Buffum,
49 Maine 108.
It was held in Massachusetts, where
two persons were partners and real estate was purchased with the funds of the
partnership and then one partner died,
that his administrators could not apply
for an order for the sale of the property,
but that the surviving partner only could
apply for such an order: Shearer v.
Paine, 12 Allen' 289. A. prior case
(Goodwin v. Richardson, 11 Mass. 469),
which was in conflict with the general
rule, was said by Mr. Justice STORY in
the Circuit Court of the United States,
in the case of Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumn.
104, to have turned upon a mere point

of local law, under a local statute, and
did not dispose of the equities of the
partners arising from general principles.
The case of Sigournef v. Munn,'7
Conn. 11, went so far in support of the
general principle, as to hold that the
rules of law which govern the transmission of personal property, apply to real
estate vrhen bought with partnership
funds. Cole.'. Coles, 15 Johns. 159, on
looking at the syllabus seems in conflict
with the general principle, but on examination it will bQ found to have been
a dispute, not over the equities of the
partners and partnership creditors, but
of the partners themselves in relation
to the surplus proceeds of sale of real
estate in an action for money had and
received. In SmitL Y. Jackson;2 Edw.
Chanc. 28, real estate of a firm was
treated as partnership assets ; and so far
has the general rule been recognised and
establislhed in New York, that it has
since been held that the surviving partner has a right to make a contract of sale
of partnership real estate to pay partnership debts, and compel the heir of his
deceased partner, although he he a minor,
to join in the deed of conveyance of the
legal title: Delmonico T. Guillame, 2
Sand. Chane. 266. The same principle
was acted upon in Andrew's Heirs v.
Brown, 21 Alabama 437. Dygerv. Clark,
5 Metc. 562.
In New Jersey, in a case where real
estate which had been purchased by a
partnership was retained by partners
and treated as real estate for a long
time after the dissolution of the firm,
and each partner had separately sold his
undivided half of the land, and the
rights of the creditors were not concerned,
it was decided that the proceeds of the
sale must be considered as proceeds of
real estate held by the partner as tenant
in common: Smith v. Wood, Saxton 74.
And in a subsequent case the same court
recognised and acted upon the principle
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that real estate purchased by a firm,
although the deed be made to one memter of it, is in equity the property of
the partnership.
Baldwin v. Johnson,
Id. 441.
In Pennsylvania, where a partnership
took a lease in fee and erected buildings
out of partner!hiip funds, and some years
after the dissolution of the firm and the
premises had ceased to be used for partnership purposes, one of the partners
mortgaged his third to a bond fide mortgagee, who had no notice of the equities of the other partners, the Supreme
Court hhel that as between the mortgagee
aad partnership creditors, the mortgaged
premi-es were to Ie considered as real
estate, and that the mortgagee was entitled to priority of payment out of the
proceeds of te undivided third mortgaged to him : 2fcDerinott v. Lawr,nce,
7 S. & R. 448. This case was decidcl
upon the question of notice, and to affect
purchasers with notice, the same court
.subscquently held that the intention of
partners to bring real estate into partnership stock should be-manifested by
writing duly recorded : Hale v. llenrie,
2 Watts 144.
In California, the mortgagee of the
undivided interest of one of three partners in real estate of the firm, was denied a decree of foreclosure and sale
under his mortgage after there hat] been
a sale of the whole property to pay partnership debts, thus recognising and
acting upon the general rule that such
propertfwas partnership assets, and not
individual property: Jones v. Parsons,
25 Cal. 100.
In Virginia, the Court of Appeals,
while recognising the general rule, held,
however, that a bond fide mortgagee of
the interest of an individual partner
was to be protected and allowed a priority: Forde v. Herron, 4 Munf. 316.
And in Pierce v. Tr;gg, 10 Leigh 406,
the court said in regard to latd purchased with partnership fundis: "1It
ought, as between the executor and Ieir,
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to replace the fund withdrawn from the
personal estate. By placing it as stock
in the partnership, the deceased evinced
a design to treat it as personalty, and it
ought to go accordingly. The representatives of the deceased can claim it
only as stock, and as stock in trade, it
is, ex vi terrnini, personal."
And see
also oDelone. v. Hutche.son, 2 Rand. 16C'
Edgarv. Donnelly, 2 Munf. 387.
In North Carolina, partition of land
held by a partnership was denied until
the accounts of the partnership were
taken, and the interest of each partner
ascertained : Baird v. Baird, I Dev. &
Bat. Eq. 524. And in South Carolina, the widovr of a copartner who had
died largely indebted to the firm was
denied dower in his legal estate in the
real property of the firm : Richardson v.
i/air, 2 ])ess. Eq. 471. And in W0ipslow v. Chiffellc, Harper's Eq. 25, real
estate of a firm was held chargeable
with the debts of the firm in preference to the separate debts of each Tnemhber. And it has since been held that
real estate of a partnership will be
treated and administered for partnership
purposes as if it were personal property:
Boijcev. Cooter, 4 Strob. Eq. Cas. 30.
The Court of Errors and Appeals in
Tennessee, decided that the real property
of a firm on the death of one partner
devolved upon the other for the purpose
of paying the debts of the firm ; and
the surplus proceeds of such real estate
went to the heir of the deceased partner:
AlcAllister v. Montlqomery, 3 Hay. 94.
And that where the title was taken in
the name of one partner, proof that partnership funds were used in the purchase
i; primdfacie evidence that it was in tendedito be held as partnership property:
Htnt v. Benson, 2 Humph. 459; and
see Yeatman N. Anderson, 6 Yerger 20.
In Ohio the widow of a partner who
had (lied largely indebted to the firm,
was denied dower in the real estate of
the firm, although the legal title was in
all the partners as tenants in common :
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Greene v. The Surviving Partners of B. Monroe 631 ; Loubat v. Nource, 5
Greene 4- Co., 1 Hamm. 535. The sub- Florida 350-63; Kramer v. Artahurs,
sequent case of Greene v. Graham, 5 7 Barr 165 ; Overholt's Appeal, 2 Jones
Hamm. 264, does not conflict with the 222; Lancaster Bank v. Alyley, I Iargeneral principle, as it simply held that ris 544; Meason v. Kaine, 13 P. F.
in the absence of proof that one half of Smith (Pa.) 335.
In Maryland the real estate of a partthe property did not belong to the deceased' partner, the grantee of his rep- nership is as between the partners and
their creditors, treated as personal proresentative was entitled to partition.
In Louisiana it has been held where perty. But when all the claims against
one partner took title to real property the firm are adjusted, in the absence of
for the benefit of the whole firm in pay- a special agreement, it the estate is
ment of a debt, and where the property solvent, a widow will be entitled to
did not enter into and become part of dower in the proceeds of the sale of such
the partnership stock, that such real real estate, coming to her husband's
property is held subject to the usual estate: Goodburn v. Stevens, 5 Gill. 27;
rules for the conveyance of real estate, Goodburn 4- Wife v. Stevens, I Maryland
and that the partner taking the title can- Ch. 420.
And from the foregoing cases may be
not alienate to the Prejudice of his partners, .and that if he does, the other deduced the other rule that the surplus
partners and the heirs of such as may proceeds of sale of the real estate of a
be deceased, may recover their undivided partnership, after the creditors are satisinterests in such property from a pur- fied, and the equities of the partners
*chaser who took the same under circum- adjusted, are to he considered as realty,
stances which made it his duty to make and that on the death of a partner his
inquiries which would have led to notice: interest in such surplus goes to his heir
Richardson v. Packwood, I Martin (N. subject to the widow's dower, and not
to his personal representative : Bluchan
S.) 290.
And the general principle was recog- v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. 165 ; Shearerv.
nised in Pugh v. Currie, 5 Ala. (N. S.) Shearer, 98 Mass. 107 ; Parsons on
446; Woolridge v. Wilkin, 3 Howard Part. 383.
M. ARNOLD.
(Miss.) 360; Thayer v. Lane, Walker's
Chancery 200; Galbraith v. Gedge: 16
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MATTER OF P. K. CHANDLER,

BANKRUPT.

A speculative option to deliver goods within a certain time at a specified price,
where the object of the parties is not a sale and delivery of the goods, but a settlement in money on differences---commonly called a "put,"-is a wagering contract and void, either as within the statutes against gambling or as against public
policy.
THE bankrupts, Peyton R. Chandler, and the firm of Chandler,
Pomeroy & Co., were engaged in buying and selling grain on the
Chicago market, and as members of the Board of Trade of that

city.

In May 1872, Peyton R. Chandler conceived the idea of
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making a corner in oats for the month of June then ensuing,
and with that view he purchased all the "cash oats" as they arrived in the market, and took all the "options" offered him for
June delivery-his purpose being to own all the oats in the market, and compel those who had sold "options" for June to pay
his price; or, in other words, to settle with him by paying such
differences as should exist between the prices at which he purchased the options and the price he should establish for cash oats
on the last day of June, when his options matured. In pursuance
of' this plan, he purchased, between the 15th of May and the 18th
of June, 2,500,000 bushels of cash oats, being all, or substantially
all, the cash oats on the market, and also bought June "options"
to the amount of 2,939,400 bushels. The total amount of oats in
store in Chicago on the 18th of June was only 2,700,000 bushels,
and the total amount received during the remainder of the month
was only 800,000 bushels. As incidental to and part of the machinery of this corner, Chandler also sold what are called "puts,"
or privileges of delivering to him oats during the month of June
for 41 cents a bushel. These "put" contracts read as follows :"Received of E. F. $50, in consideration of which we give him,
or the holder of this contract, the privilege of delivering to us or
not, prior to 3 o'clock P. m. of June 30th 1872, by notification
or delivery, 10,000 bushels No. 2 oats, regular receipts, at 41 cents
per bushel, in store, and, if delivered, we agree to receive and pay
for the same at the above price.
Chicago, June -, 1872.
CHANDLER, POMEROY & Co.
R. P. CHANDLER."

The amount paid by the purchaser of these "puts" was j cent
per bushel for whatever quantity was named in the contracts. The
total quantity of oats called for by these "puts" amounted to
about 3,700,000 bushels.
When Chandler commenced to buy oats with a view to the corner, the price in the Chicago market was about 39 cents a bushel.
After he took possession of the market he put the price to 41
cents and upwards, and held it there until the 18th of June. In
the meantime the price had declined in New York and other markets, so that oats to ship were not worth over 33 to 35 cents, and
July options for this market were not worth over 86 cents. On
the 18th of June P. R. Chandler and Chandler, Pomeroy & Co.
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failed, and the price declined before the close of business that day
from 41 to 30 cents, and continued to decline during the remainder of the month, so that at one time they were as low as 26
cents per bushel.
Between the time of the failure and 3 o'clock on the 80th of
June, the holders of the "gRuts" claim to have made tender to the
bankrupts of the quantity of oats called for by their respective
tickets, and the oats not being accepted and paid for, they sold
them upon the market that day or the next, under the rules of the
Board of Trade, and proved their claims for the differenees between the price named in the "put" and that for which they sold.
The total amount of claims thus proved was about $400,000,
and the total amount received by the bankrupts for these puts was
less than $19,000. The assignee of Chandler moved to expunge
the claims of this kind from the list of debts proved.
BLODGETT. J.-The proof shows conclusively that the plans of
Chandler and the fact that he was manipulating the market with
express reference to a corner in oats for June, were well known
and understood on the Board of Trade, while the number of these
"put" claims, about 125, all, or substantially all, in favor of
members of the board, show that the struggle between Chandler,
who was endeavoring to hold up prices, and t'he sellers of " options"
and holders of "puts" who were endeavoring to break the price,
was quite generally participated in by members of the board. In
other words, it was notorious that Chandler was endeavoring to
keep the price at 41 cents or upwards, while the sellers of "options"
and holders of "puts" were endeavoring to break down the Irice.
It is true that in this testimony some of the claimants say there
was no "corner," or that they did not know that there wTas a
oorner, but the cross-examination shows that they knew Chandler
was trying to make a corner, and they say he did not do it because he failed before the end of the month, so that by their own
admission, they knew what he was attempting, knew the reasons
for his purchase of such large quantities .of "cash oats,t ai!
options, and knew he did not sustain his corner because the
"short" interest broke him down, and the moment a man bought
a "put," he became identified with the short interest-his interests
were antagonistic to Chandler.
-The assignee attacks these claims upon the ground that they
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are fraudulent as against the other creditors of the bankrupt.
The main ground, and the only one which I shall consider, being
that they are wager-contracts, and therefore void. Without taking
time to discuss all the points raised by the able arguments which
have been adduced, and the various reasons urged for and against
these claims, it is enough to say that it seems to me that the contracts in question partake of all the characteristics of a wager. It
is in substance an assertion by the seller of the "put" that oats
cannot be purchased on that market before 3 o'clock r. m. of the
30th of June for less than 41 cents a bushel, and an undertaking
to pay the difference between 41 cents and any market price. If
he, Chandler, sustains the price at 41 cents or above, he wins the
half-cent a bushel paid for the "put," because the holder will not
deliver, while if the price goes below that named he is to pay the
difference. This is practically the contract.
It is as manifestly a bet upon the future price of the grain in
question, as any which could be made upon the speed of a horse
or the turn of a card. The evidence in this case shows that in
nearly all the cases of settlements on "put" or "option" contracts,
the grain is never delivered nor expected to be delivered, but the
parties simply pay the difference, as settled by the prices. But,
if that were not so in all cases, it is clear that in this case no delivery of the grain was intended by these "put" holders, because
they knew that Chandler controlled all the oats in the market and
fixed the price, and that their only expectation for success depended
on their being able to break the market before their time for delivery expired. Some of them say-Bensley, I think-that they
intended to deliver the oats, but it is absurd to suppose that they
intended to deliver, unless they could do so for less than forty-one
cents. They intended to deliver if they could break Chandler, or
prevent his "corner" from culminating, as the jockey may intend
to walk his own horse over the course after he has poisoned or
lamed that of his competitor. They did not intend to deliver, if
Chandler succeeded. Thus a struggle inevitably ensued between
Chandler and the holders of this immense ainount of "puts" and
"options," Chandler alone on one side attempting to hold up the
price, and all the rest seeking to put it down. The fact that the
sellers of " options" and holders of "puts" were able to get resolutions through the Board of Trade, making new warehouses,
where oats had never been stored before, "regular" for the perVOL. XXHII.-21
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formance of these contracts, shows the intensity of the contest
and the overwhelming influences with which Chandler had to contend. I do not mean to be understood as saying that the fact that
Chandler sold "puts" to so many as to create an overwhelming
opposition, makes the transaction any more or less a wager than
if he had only sold one "put," but it shows the notoriety of the
whole proceedings.
From the very nature of the transaction the interest of the
holder of the "put" is to break down the price and that of the
seller to maintain it. The number engaged in this transaction,
and the quantities involved, demonstrate that neither party expected any grain to be delivered. Chandler expected to hold up
the price, in which event no grain would be offered him, and the
other parties must have known they could not get the grain to
deliver unless they first broke Chandler, as he held all the grain,
and then, although they might tender, he could not receive, so
that in payment no actual delivery was anticipated. They made
their tenders only as a method of establishing differences after he
had failed, and was powerless.
That transactions of this kind are only wagers is abundantly established by authorities: Grizewood v. Blain, 11 Com. Bench 538;
Brua's Appeal, 55 Penn. St. 298 ; Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall, manuscript opinion of Sup. Ct. Pa,; Ex parte Afankam, 2 De G., F.& J.,
634 ; Cassard v. .inman, 1 Bosworth 207. It is true those cases
arose under statutes making such transactions void as gaming contracts. But the test applied was: Did the parties intend to sell
on one side and buy on the other the stocks which purported to
be the subject-matter of the transaction, or did they only intend
to adjust the differences ? And as it was found that they only
meant differences when they said shares, the contracts were held to
be essentially gambling contracts, and therefore void.
It is said, however, that there is no statute in this state expressly
prohibiting contracts of this kind, as there is in England and
Pennsylvania; and, as the Supreme Court of this state has decided that wagers are not necessarily void, therefore, these contracts-not being inhibited by any express law of this state-are
not void. There is no dispute that contracts of wager are valid
at common law, unless affected with some special cause of invalidity:
Ball v. Gilbert, 12 Met. 397. But wagers which are contrary to
public policy have always been held by the courts to be essentially
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void, without statutory prohibition, and cannot be made the
ground of an action: Hartley v. Rice, 10 East 22. And a high authority in the profession has stated the law on the subject of the
validity of wagers with great force and clearness, when he says:
"As the moral sense of the present day regards all gaming or
wagering contracts as inconsistent with the interests of the corn-'
munity, and at variance with the laws of morality, the exception
necessarily becomes the rule :" 2 Smith Lead. Cases 806.
Indeed, any one rising from a full examination of the law applicable to wagers, as expounded by the courts, would undoubtedly
testify that while he has found in the books, and especially among
the older text-writers and cases, general expressions to the effect
that wagers were valid at common law, he has found the cases,
where they have been enforced, to be extremely rare, and the
courts have been astute to find reasons for not enforcing them.
Following this general current of authority, the Supreme Court
of this state, under the statute prohibiting gaming, has decided
that the wagers upon horse-races are void, and cannot be enforced;
and that money paid on such wagers can be recovered back: 23
Ill. 493; 51 I1. 473. The language of the Illinois statute on
which these decisions are based, is, in substance, that all promises
made, &c., where the consideration or any part thereof shall be
money won by gaming, &c., shall be void.
The language of 8 and 9 Vict., on which Grizewood v.
Blain and other English cases were decided, is: "All contracts
or agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming
or wagering, shall be null and void." The precise question made
in this case has never been before the Supreme Court of this state
to my knowledge, and I am not aware that it has ever been raised
at the Circuit, except in a late case before his Honor Judge TREE,
,,f this city, when he held that " option contracts for grain, when
the parties intended only to pay the differences and not to deliver
grain, were void, as wagering contracts." I quote him as reported
in the daily papers of this city. But it hardly seems possible that
any court called upon to construe the Illinois statute in the light
of the expositions already made by our courts and of the English
decisions upon a statute so substantially similar, could hesitate to
pronounce these contracts wagers, and void as contrary to the
statute.
But even if not within the letter or spirit of the statute of this
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state, the common-law authorities quoted, show that all wagers
contrary to the public policy are void without reference to any
statute. And, as the contracts under consideration are essentially
nothing but bets upon the price of oats in this market within the
time limited, and as it is obvious that the effect of such transac,,ions is to beget wild speculations, to derange prices, to make
prices artificially high or low, as the interests, strength and skill
of the manipulators shall dictate, thereby tending to destroy
healthy business and unsettle legitimate commerce, there can be
no doubt of the injurious tendency of such contracts, and that
they should be held void as against public policy. As is most
cogently said by the leArned judge who delivered the opinion in
the case cited from 55 Penna. :"Anything which induces men to risk their money or property
without any other hope of. return than to get for nothing any
given amount from another, is gambling, and demoralizes the community, no matter by what name it may be called."
The financial disaster and ruin which followed "Black Friday"
in New York, and the scarcely less damaging local consequences
which followed the various "corpers" which have either succeeded
or been attempted in this city, furnish conclusive proof, if proof
were needed, that such gambling operations should be held void,
as contrary to public policy.
The total amount paid by the claimants in these cases was less
than $19,000, and yet the amount they claim is within a fraction
of $400,000-a disparity between the consideration paid and the
sum demanded which strikes the mind at once as so grossly inequitable that the judicial conscience is shocked, and revolts from
being made the instrument for enforcing such outrageous injustice.
I do not intend to be understood as holding that every option
contract for the delivery of grain or stock, or that every "1put," is
necessarily void, but only that all these contracts, in the light of
the testimony before the court, were in their essential features
gambling contracts. The parties when they made them did not
intend to deliver the grain, but only at the utmost to settle the
differences. They knew they could not obtain the grain to deliver.
if Chandler sustained his "corner," and their action in buying a
"put" was virtually a bet on their part that he could not accomplish what they all knew he was endeavoring to do, that is, keep
up the price through June to his own figures, and virtually a bet
on his part that he could do so.
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It is shown in the proof, and urged in the argument, that the
"put" is in itself a very harmless contract-that dealers frequently resort to them as a method of insuring prices. It is
answer enough to this to say that the proof fails to show that such
was the object of any of these claimants. Chandler was taking
all the cash oats offered at the price named in the "puts" and
upward, and none, with the exception of Bensley, claim that they
had any oats to fill the "puts," at the timethey bought, or bought for
that purpose till after Chandler's failuro. It is perhaps possible
to imagine a dealer with a stock of grain on hand which he wishes
to hold for an advance, who may take a privilege of this kind to
insure himself against a decline while waiting for an advance.
But the very act of offering to sell a "put" either implies that the
seller has control of the market so that he expects to make his
own price, or else it is a mere reckless assertion of the seller's
opinion that the price will be maintained, either of which partakes
of the character of a bet.
"A wager," says Bouvier, "is a contract by which two or more
parties agree that a sum of money or other thing shall be paid or
delivered to one of them on the happening or not happening of an
uncertain event."
To say that these contracts were taken for the purpose of insurance is too far-fetched an excuse, and evidently an afterthought.
In what I have said I do not intend to vindicate Chandler.
His conduct was as reprehensible as that of the claimants. All
were engaged in an immoral and illegal transaction, and this court
ought not to allow its powers to be prostituted to the enforcement
of these contracts for either party. Money lost at play or in
gaming cannot be recovered except where an action is given by
statute, but, as I have already intimated my opinion that these
cases are within the statute of this state on the subject of gaming
under which money paid may be recovered back, I shall allow the
claimants to prove their claims for the amounts actually paid by
them respectively, which is a half-cent per bushel on the grain
named on their tickets.
The foregoing case, for which we are
indebted to the Chicago Legal News,
seems to us one of great importance,
just now in particular, and we are glad
to lend our aid in making it more gen-

erally known to the profession and the
people, as far as in our power.
Wcdonotpurposegoingintonmuchdiscussion upon the legal questions involved
in the opinion. They are there fully
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discussed and the leading authorities
referred to. We can entertain no question of the entire soundness of the decision. We know that wagers at common law were held valid, unless in
some way against public policy, either
in the subject-matter or the contemplated
mode of consummation. This exception, as stated in the opinion, has, from
time to time, been so enlarged as to
ecome the general rule, both in England
and America. Some of the states have
expressly decided that all wagers are
illegal. Collamer v. Day, 2 Vt. 144,
and other similar cases might be referred
to. Stockjobbing, or dealing in differences, has now become the chief
business of the stock exchange, in our
country, if we exclude speculations in
gold, which are conducted in the same
manner, and can only be cured by restoring the currency to the specie basis ;
this demoralizing and degrading species
of wagering or gambling, is no doubt,
generally reprobated by the lovers of
morality and decency throughout the
country; but we do not seem to approach
even toward its extinction. The English
Statute 7 Geo. 2, c. 8, made perpetual
by 10 Geo. 2, c. 8, is directed exclusively
against such dealing in the public stocks
of the country. These statutes make all
contracts for the sale of public stocks to
be delivered at a future day, when the
seller had no such stocks at the date of

the contract and none were ever intended
to be transferred under it, but only the
payment of differences, illegal and void ;
railway shares were held not within time
statute: lewett v. Price, 4 M. & G.
355 ; Fisher v. Price, I1 IBeavan 194.
But this statute was not intended to aftLcet
bond fide sales of public stocks, Lord
AmxGER, C. B., in Mortinier v. McCmdlore, 6 '1. & V. 69. But in a later
case, Grizewood Y. Blai,, 11 C. 1.
538, it was held that a sale of railway
shares to be delivered in future, where
only differences were expected to be paid,
was gaming, within 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109,
j 18. And we think it is generally
considered in this country that all mere
speculations in differences upon he stock
exchange is gaming, and as such illegal.
And it requires little wisdom or comprehension to see that similar contracts
in the staple products of the country
are none the less corrupting and immoral. We do not, of course, know
what effect it will be likely to produce,
when all such speculating contracts are
condemned by the courts, as a species
of gaming.
The love of gaming, in
some form, is deeply rooted in civilization ; and Christianity seems not essentially to lessen its force or prevalence.
But it is something to know, and feel,
that the thing is illegal and immoral in
whatever form disguised.
I. F. R.
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The late war between the United States and the Confederate States, was a public
war in such sense that all the people of one section were public enemies of the people of the other section.
An alien enemy, though he may not sue, may be sued and his property within
reach of process subjected to execution during the war.
The right of a mortgagee under a power in the mortgage to sell the mortgaged
premises in case of default, is not impaired or suspended by the war, on account
of the voluntary residence of the mortgagor in the hostile section.
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Notice required under a power of sale in a mortgage is not for the benefit of the
mortgagor in the sense of notice to him. It is only to secure his right to a fair
sale of the property.

ERROR to St. Louis Circuit Court.
The petition set out a purchase by the plaintiffs from the defendants in the year 1857 of certain real estate in the city of St.
Louis, and the giving of notes for the consideration, secured by
deed of trust, payable in one, two, three and four years, the last
becoming payable on the 30th of April 1861 ; a failure to pay the
last note and a sale by the trustee in consequence, on the 9th of
June 1861, after publication of notice as required by the deed of
trust. It was alleged that all the notes were paid except that
which matured on the 80th of April 1861, and that the plaintiffs
were ready and willing to pay this also, but were prevented by a
state of war, existing at that time, between the United States of
America, of which Missouri was a part, and the Confederate States,
of which Virginia was a part; and that the plaintiffs were in 1857,
and in 1861, and during the whole of the war which followed,
citizens and residents of the county of Caroline, Va. By reason
of the war existing it was alleged that the notice and sale under
the deed of trust were fraudulent and void. It was averred that
as soon as peace was restored, the plaintiffs tendered to the purchaser of the land the amount due under the deed of trust, which
was refused, and they prayed that the deed made by the trustees
under the sale of June 9th 1861, be set aside and annulled. To
this petition the defendants demurred, assigning for causes of demurrer that the petition showed no cause of action ; that it appeared that at the time the default was made there was no suspension of intercourse between the citizens of Virginia and those of
Missouri, and that even when the sale was made under the deed
of trust, there was no such suspension, and that there was no
excuse for the non-payment of the note of the plaintiffs. The
court below overruled the demurrer and gave judgment for the
plaintiffs.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WAGNR, C. J.-Whether there was any real or actual suspension of the relations theretofore existing prior to the Act of Con.
gress of July 12th 1861, empowering the President to prohibit, by
proclamation, all commercial intercourse between the rebellious and
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the loyal states, and the proclamation of the President in pursuance
thereof, issued August 16th 1861, I will not stop to inquire. The
case has been argued here upon the theory that at the time the
sale took place, Virginia had passed her ordinance of secession,
and was out of the Union, and was among the number waging war
against the general government. If so, her citizens were entitled
to belligerent rights, and were clothed with all the characteristics
of alien enemies.
Since the decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States
in the cascs of The Venice, 2 Wall. 258; -Mrs. Alexander's
Cotton, 2 Wall. 404; Hanson v. Insurance Company, 6 Wall.
1; The Ouachita Cotton, 6 Wall. 521; h'unger v. Abbott, 6
Wall. 5"32; Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. 542; M4IcIee v. United
States, 8 Wall. 163; and the United States v. Grossmayer, 9
Wall. 72, the question must be regarded as settled, that the late
war between the Confederate States and the United States was
a public war, and a war, not only between the respective governments, but between all the inhabitants of the one territory on the
one side and all the inhabitants of the other territory on the other
side, so that all the people of each occupied the respective positions of enemies during the continuance of the war.
The consequence of a state of war is the interruption and interdiction of all commercial intercourse, correspondence and dealing
between the subjects of the hostile countries. Kent says the interdiction flows necessarily from the principle that a state of war
puts all the members of the two nations respectively in hostility
to each other, and to suffer individuals to carry on a friendly and
commercial intercourse while the two governments were at war
would be placing the act of government and the acts of individuals
in contradiction to each other: 1 Kent Com. 66.
• As a corollary of this doctrine the principle is well established
that an alien enemy cannot sue a friendly citizen in the courts of
the latter's country: Bac. Abr. Alien D; Alcinous v. N'igren, 4
El. & BI. 217; D~e Wahl v. Braune, 1 H. & N. 178 ; Whelan v.
Cook, 29 Md. 1; U. S. v. 1756 Shares of Stock, 5 Blatch. 231.
His disability is temporary in its nature, and personal, and founded
upon reason and policy, and in a great measure upon necessity.
But no such reason or policy forbids judicial proceedings against
an alien enemy in favor of a friendly citizen, and the rule is there-
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fore settled that while an alien enemy may not sue, he may be
sued at law.
The question has frequently been brought up in our courts in
regard to matters arising out of the late rebellion, and adjudications in the courts of last resort have all been in accordance with
the principles above announced.
In Mixer et al. v. Sibley, 58 Ill. 61, it was decided that when a
party residing in the state of Illinois holding a promissory note
against a person residing in one of the states in rebellion, in the
year 1862, after the Act of Congress and the President's proclaination prohibiting commercial intercourse between the adhering
states and those in rebellion, commenced a suit thereon by attachment, which was levied on real estate situated in that state belonging to the maker, and obtained a judgment and procured a
sale to be made of the premises attached, that the court had jurisdiction of the cause, and the judgment and proceedings thereunder
were valid and binding, notwithstanding the defendant resided in
one of the rebellious states, and the war at the time was in active
progress.
In the case of -Dorsey v. Kyle et al., 30 Md. 512, the court
holds that a person who, by his own voluntary act, assumed the
attitude of an alien enemy to his state and to the government of
the United States, going from Maryland to Virginia during the
late civil war, allying himself with the Southern cause and joining
the Confederate army, cannot claim exemption from process of attachment in behalf of antecedent creditors, against his property
remaining in the state, on the ground that he was an alien enemy,
and that all legal remedies were suspended during the period of
hostilities. It is emphatically declared that neither reason nor
policy forbids judicial proceedings against an alien enemy in favor
of a friendly citizen, and therefore while an alien enemy may not
sue he may be sued at law. The same question again arose in
Dorsey v. Dorsey, Id. 522, and the same principle was again asserted and reaffirmed.
The same conclusion was arrived at in the case of Thomas v.
Afahone, in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky (12 Am. Law Reg.,
N. S. 433). There the Civil Code of Kentucky authorized the creditors of a citizen who departed from the county of his residence and
remained absent thirty days within the Confederate lines, to attach
his property and sell the same for the payment of their debts. The
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plaintiff left his home and joined the Confederate service, and while
so absent attachments were procured and his -property sold, and
the court held that the fact that the debtor was a soldier in the
Confederate army would not deprive the court of jurisdiction under
the Code. LINDSAY, J., in delivering the opinion of the court,
pointedly remarks: "It does not follow because appellant was at
the time a soldier in the army of the belligerent power, and that
all unlicensed communication with him by the people of the states
adhering to the Federal Union was inhibited, not only by the laws
of war but by express statute, that resident creditors might not
sue him in the courts of this state and subject to the judgment of
their debts"such of his property as might be found within the local
jurisdiction of the courts in which he was sued. The right of resident creditors so to proceed against parties indebted to them
residing within the lines of the hostile power and held to be public
enemies by reason of their participation in the Southern movement,
was recognised by the Federal Congress in the Act of March 3d
1863 (2 Bright. Dig.1238), providing for the seizure and confiscation of the property of such persons."
In (Jruteherv. Hind and wife, 4 Bush 363, the same court held
that a proceeding by a Kentucky creditor to enforce his lien on
land situated in that state was not inierdicted, notwithstanding the
existence of the war and the residence of the debtors within the
Confederate lines. The Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Mc Veigh v. The United States, 11 Wall. 259, after citing
Albritche v. Leissmann, 2 Yes. and Bea. 324, Bacon's Abridgment
and Story's Equity P1. § 53, for authority, say: "Whatever may
be the extent of the disability of an alien enemy to sue in the
courts of the hostile country, it is clear that he is liable to be sued."
It is contended that the case of Dean v. .Nelson, 10 Wall. 158,
asserts a contrary doctrine. That case was a proceeding -within
an insurrectionary district, but held by the national military forces,
in a court established by military orders alone. It was a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage on personal property, and it was instituted against parties who had been expelled by military force from
their residence and who were forbidden absolutely by the order
which expelled them from coming back again within the lines of
the military authority which organized the court. They were not
voluntarily within the Confederate lines, but were sent there against
their will, and inasmuch as without their consent and against their
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will, they were thus driven from their homes and forbidden to return by the arbitrary act of the military power, it was held that a
judicial decree by which their property was sold during the continuance in force of this order was void as to them.
Bat in the subsequent case of Ludlow v. Ramsey, 11 Wall. 581,
it was adjudged that the doctrine of Dean v. 'elso&that a judicial
proceeding on a mortgage carried on within the Union lines against
a person driven by way of retaliation for outrages committed by
others outside of those lines, and prohibited from returning within
them, did not apply to a person who went and remained voluntarily in rebellion. Such a person could not complain of legal proceedings regularly prosecuted against him as an absentee.
But there is another aspect in which this case must be considered, and which is really the principal point, and upon which I
would have been satisfied to have placed it had not the counsel for
the defendants in error, plaintiffs in the court below, insisted in
their briefs that the war produced an entire suspension of all
proceedings whatever between the citizens of the respective sides,
and avoided all judicial process. The sale was made under a,deed
of trust, containing an agreement that in default of payment when
the notes matured, the trustee, upon giving the requisite notice,
should proceed to sell the property to satisfy the debt. It contained a power coupled with an interest which was irrevocable in
its character, and when the contingency arose calling forth its
execution, the trustee was authorized to execute it regardless of
the status of the grantors at the particular time. So as far as the
authority of the trustee was concerned to go on and make a sale
of the property in satisfaction of the debt, it made no difference
whether the grantors were in the Confederate lines or in the jungles
of India, or even if they were dead. It may be conceded that they
were in a place or in a condition where it was physically impossible
for notice to reach them, but that would not alter the case, as the
notice was not designed to be given for their benefit in the sense
of notice to them. It was intended to notify the community that
the sale would take place in order that bidders might be present to
purchase the property.
In the case of Beatie v. Butler, 21 Mo. 213, it appears that
Beatie borrowed a certain sum of money, and, to secure its payment, he executed a mortgage on real estate containing a power of
sale. Before the note was paid off Beatie died, and after his death
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the rhortgagee sold the property. Neither the widow nor children
of Beatie were notified of the sale. Afterwards they moved to set
aside the sale, but the court denied the motion, holding that the
death of the mortgagor did not extinguish or suspend the power
of sale in the mortgage. SCOTT, J., in writing the opinion of the
court, says: "The argument that the death of Beatie should have
suspended all proceedings under the mortgage, in analogy to the
suspension of all process of execution under the administration law
against the estate of defendants, cannot be maintained. The law
may suspend its own process. As it gives the process, it may
regulate it. But deeds of trust and mortgages, with a power
of sale, arise from the consent and agreement of parties, and there
is no propriety in depriving creditors of the fruits of their foresight and caution. The statute of the 25th of January 1847 is
an answer to the argument. That statute, notwithstanding the
death of the grantor in a deed of trust, recognises a right of sale
in the trustee, though it is postponed for nine months after the
death of the maker of the deed."
The precise question now under consideration arose in Harper
et al. v. .ly et al., 56 Ill. 179, where the court decided that the
remedy of the holder of a mortgage in that state to make sale of
the mortgaged premises in case of default, under a power in the
mortgage, was in no wise impaired or suspended during the existence of hostilities in the late war of the rebellion on account of
the residence of the mortgagor and his grantee subsequent to the
mortgage within the rebellious states; and that the rule applied as
well to the grantee of the mortgage, who always resided within one
of the states which, after conveyance to him, joined in the rebellion, as to the mortgagor himself, who, after making the mortgage,
left his residence in one of the loyal states for the purpose of
engaging in hostilities against the government.
The very recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Washington. University v. Pinch et al., reported in the
Central Law Journal No. 6, 1874, is in point. In that case the
facts are that Daly and Chambers purchased of W. G. Eliot in
March 1860, certain real estate in the city of St. Louis, and gave
a deed of trust to secure the purchase-money. In this deed Ranlett was trustee. The purchasers were citizens and residents of
Virginia. Ranlett, as trustee, advertised and sold the premises in
December 1862, after the establishment of non-intercourse between
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the government and the Confederate States. The United States
Circuit Court declared the sale to be unlawful because of the nonintercourse, and set aside the deed made by the trustee. The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment, and directed
the Circuit Court to dismiss the bill. Mr. Justice MILLER, who
wrote the opinion, in commenting upon Dean v. Nelson, Bupra,
said that the court had "never decided nor intentionally given
expression to the idea that the property of citizens of the rebel
states, located in the loyal states, was, by the mere existence of the
war exempt from judicial process for debts due to citizens in the
loyal states contracted before the war." Upon the merits of the
immediate case under consideration, the learned judge remarked:
"The debt was due and unpaid. The obligation which the trustee
had assumed on a condition had become absolute by the presence of
that condition. If the complainants had been dead, the sale would
not have been void, for that reason, if made after the nine months,
which a statute of Missouri suspends the right to sell in such cases.
If they had been in Japan, it would have been no legal reason for
delay. The power under which the sale was made was irrevocable.
The creditors had both a legal and a moral right to have the power,
made for its benefit, executed. The enforced absence of the complainants, if it be conceded that it was enforced, does not, in our
judgment, afford a sufficient reason for arresting his agent and the
agent of the creditor in performing a duty which both of them
imposed on him before the war began. * * * The interest of the
complainants in the land might have been liable to confiscation by
the government; yet we are told that this right of the creditor
could not be enforced, nor the power of the trustee lawfully exercised. No authority in this country "or any other is shown us for
this proposition. It rests upon inference from the general doctrine
of absolute non-intercourse between citizens of states which are
in a state of public war with each other, but no case has been cited
of this kind even in such a war.
It is said that the power to sell in the deed of trust requiied a
notice of the sale in a newspaper; that this notice was intended
to apprise the complainants of the time and place of sale, and
that, as it was impossible for such notice to reach the complainants,
no sale could be made. If this reasoning were sound, the grantors
in such a deed need only go to a place where the newspapers
could not reach them to delay the sale indefinitely or defeat it

